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Rules in the modern administrative state tend to lag behind reality, and a 
key contributor to this stickiness – the volume of regulated activity – is largely 
ignored. When legislators or agency staff initially write rules to constrain the 
externalities of an activity, they assume that the activity will occur at a 
particular scale. Based on the known impacts at this scale, policymakers and 
regulators balance the harms of the regulated activity against the costs of 
regulation to industry, striking a compromise within the chosen rule or 
choosing to not regulate at all. 
If the activity later expands from this baseline, the harm/regulatory cost 
balance becomes precarious – the rules remain stuck at the baseline. Yet the 
growing activity sometimes produces more harms, including simple harms, 
each of which has an independent probability of occurring; these risks can 
accumulate. Expanding activities also can have effects with interdependent 
risks that expand disproportionately with the time, density, and location of 
activity. Finally, growing activities might generate uneven impacts, which are 
shouldered disproportionately by certain communities. 
These harms, combined with a lack of adequate public law response, 
produce what I call regulatory diseconomies of scale – disproportionately 
negative effects sometimes associated with the expansion of a long-regulated 
activity. But this is not a one-way ratchet: although this Article focuses on 
diseconomies, in many cases harms might decline with increasing scale. 
Industry might innovate and develop new pollution control technologies or 
more efficient processes, thus lowering the need for regulation. Alternatively, 
the scale of activity might decline, thus producing fewer harms, yet old, 
stringent rules remain in place. The failure of rules to respond to either rising 
or falling harm is due largely to scale blindness in public law – our 
assumption that familiar activities that we already regulate do not require 
substantially different remedies when the scale, rather than the nature, of the 
activity changes. 
There are clear solutions to this problem, and many of them could be 
applied ex ante. Laws could (and sometimes do) include harm thresholds, 
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which impose more or less stringent controls on individual activities as they 
grow (or shrink) and move closer to or further from a harm threshold. Our 
laws also could anticipate and avoid various confluences of events – activities 
occurring at high densities in sensitive environmental areas, for example. 
Finally, regulatory institutions could be designed to automatically grow or 
shrink at certain levels of regulated activity. If more regulation was needed to 
address disproportionately expanding harms, for example, regulated actors 
could pay for the added cost through higher permitting fees. 
This Article identifies and analyzes regulatory diseconomies of scale as a 
core failure of the modern administrative state, using oil and gas development 
enabled by hydraulic fracturing and older environmental challenges as 
examples. It then proposes solutions, suggesting how our system of public law 
– and the institutions that write and implement laws – must better anticipate 
and address this phenomenon. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most common weaknesses of the modern regulatory state is the 
failure of laws or institutions to anticipate and account for the expansion or 
decline of regulated activities. When legislatures or agencies write a rule, they 
nearly always assume that the regulated activity will occur at a particular scale 
– that there will be one thousand factories emitting a pollutant, or one million 
mortgages of a particular type. Based on this assumption, legislators or agency 
actors limit the externalities of the activity to a level that seems appropriate in 
light of assumed total harms as compared to the costs imposed on regulated 
entities and agencies by rule implementation (regulatory costs). They might, 
for example, impose laxer controls on regulated actors if the regulated activity 
is relatively benign or regulatory costs are high. Alternatively, they might 
decide not to regulate at all. If the regulated activity later expands in scale,1 it 
 
1 I use “scale” in its traditional definitional sense to describe a simple increase in 
number. This is somewhat different from uses of the term in other contexts. See, e.g., NEIL 
BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 9 
(2004) (defining geographic conceptions of scale, including, among others, “the level of 
geographical resolution at which a given phenomenon is thought of, acted on or studied,” 
and “the geographical resolution of contradictory processes of competition and 
cooperation”); Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233, 234-35 (2007) (introducing ecological and 
geographical scaling concepts and using them). While the numerical expansions that I 
describe typically cause the activity to increase in geographic scope and to draw in more 
governmental actors, scaling problems in regulation can occur without these additional 
factors: the sheer rise in volume of regulated activity is the heart of the problem. Legal 
scholars tend to use scale to describe situations where effects do not match agency 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural 
Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1423-24 (2011) (explaining that 
“anthropogenic climate change . . . increases the interaction of jurisdictions and the extent of 
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may cause harms to grow, and sometimes in a disproportionate manner – 
generating unusually large impacts at certain times or in particular regions. In a 
mirror image of this phenomenon, old, stringent rules might stick despite 
harms that decline as industries grow and innovate, or as industries shrink.2 
The initial balance of regulatory costs as compared to the harms of the 
regulated activity changes, yet the laws often do not. 
The growing harms of an expanding activity, the imbalance this expansion 
causes, and the regulatory lag that ensues combine to create a phenomenon 
described here as a regulatory diseconomy of scale.3 The over-regulation of an 
activity that produces shrinking harms as it grows or declines in scale is 
equally problematic, of course: excessive controls might block needed 
economic growth. But in this Article I focus on the growth of harms in a 
negative direction – when society might have inadequate opportunities to 
bargain for harm reduction and regulation does not change. Our laws and 
scholarship have not yet comprehensively identified4 or adequately addressed 
 
regulatory overlap among government authorities” and thus makes it difficult to “identify a 
single appropriate regulatory scale for managing natural resources”); Robin Kundis Craig, 
Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 
922 (2008) (describing the complexity of watersheds and possible models for “managing 
interjurisdictional natural resources across regulatory scales”). Several of the scaling 
problems highlighted in this Article do not involve an externality-jurisdictional boundary 
mismatch; they are simply disproportionate expansions of an activity within one 
jurisdiction, to which the responsible agency is blind.  
2 A forthcoming article by J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman partially addresses the mirror 
image of the diseconomies problem, exploring why it is that we do not tend to put in place 
formal termination points or exit strategies for rules that are no longer needed, and how we 
might do this. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Time to Say Goodbye: Exit in the Regulatory 
State (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
3 Other legal scholars use the term “diseconomies of scale” in different contexts. They 
employ this term to describe how agencies make broad rules to address large problems, thus 
reducing flexibility. A larger scale of regulation, as opposed to decentralized, nuanced 
controls, reduces the costs of enforcement but may ultimately increase the cost borne by 
regulatory targets. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and 
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1298 (1992) (discussing diseconomies of scale in 
the “[c]entralized public enforcement” context, which arise from “multiple layers of 
decision and review and the temptation to adopt overly rigid norms in order to reduce 
administrative costs”).  
4 This Article explores a three-part problem: initial assumptions about the scale of a 
regulated activity, which are captured in the regulatory cost-harm balance; disproportionate 
harms (both independent and interdependent) caused by expanding regulated activity that 
throw off the initial regulatory balance; and associated regulatory lag. Scholars have 
addressed pieces of this larger, more pervasive problem – particularly the fact that small 
sources can contribute to large collective harm. For a discussion of situations in which 
individual activities have relatively small impacts but are collectively problematic as the 
“one percent problem,” see Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent 
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2011) (“[T]he one percent problem arises when 
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this problem, which is pervasive in environmental law and likely extends to 
many other areas. 
A long-used technology5 called hydraulic fracturing, and the oil and gas 
development that it enables, provides one of the clearest examples of a likely 
 
the relatively small size of low-percentage contributors is taken as a reason for exempting 
those contributors from regulation despite the fact that the regulatory problem cannot be 
solved without regulating those sources.”). Other work describes “small harms,” pointing to 
small adverse impacts to habitats that collectively have major effects on species, and has 
suggested the Clean Air Act’s use of pollutant thresholds as a model solution for this 
problem. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 195 (2012) (explaining that under the Clean Air Act, “determining on 
an ad hoc, project-by-project basis what level of emissions should trigger regulation would 
be nearly impossible” and that the Act therefore requires states to write plans with a 
“comprehensive approach” through which officials consider “the aggregate consequences of 
all of the actions threatening the cause environmental degradation” and must ensure that 
emissions will “attain the ultimate air quality goal” (the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard)). Earlier pieces explore individual impacts that generate collective problems. See 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 264 (2001) (explaining 
that “conventional regulation has been less successful at controlling emissions from small 
mobile sources, such as automobiles, or diffuse sources, such [as] farms” and offering 
theories for the causes of this failure); William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and 
the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 728-29 (1987) (attributing declining air 
quality to small sources (cars) and discussing water quality problems arising from small yet 
numerous nonpoint sources). Others have identified the sometimes interdependent impacts 
of certain activities. J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, for example, although not focusing on 
one type of activity that becomes collectively problematic, describe how numerous diverse 
sources can cause a variety of effects, including those that accrue in the future, and those 
that are interactive or dramatically high above a certain point. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, 
Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide 
for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 75-79 (2010) (defining massive problems as 
including problems that “are large in scale or have significant time lags” and have 
“cumulative effects” that build up in different ways “over time and space” or “are subject to 
nonlinear tipping points”). 
5 Certain aspects of this technology are new. In Texas in the late 1990s, energy 
companies developed a specific technique called “slickwater” fracturing that used higher 
volumes of water and often required horizontal drilling. See Water Use in the Barnett Shale, 
R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/wateruse_barnettshale.php 
(last updated Jan. 24, 2011) (“Slick water fracing of a vertical well completion can use over 
1.2 million gallons (28,000 barrels) of water, while the fracturing of a horizontal well 
completion can use over 3.5 million gallons (over 83,000 barrels) of water.”); see also Jay 
A. Rushing & Richard B. Sullivan, Improved Water-Frac Increases Production, 
EXPLORATION & PROD. MAG. (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.epmag.com/EP-Magazine/archive 
/Improved-water-frac-increases-production_661 (describing changes in gel and water-based 
techniques); Hong Sun et al., A Nondamaging Friction Reducer for Slickwater Frac 
Applications 1 (Soc’y Petroleum Eng’rs, Paper No. SPE 139480, 2011) (“Slickwater 
fracturing, different from fracturing using cross-linked fluids, has been developed and used 
in tight gas sand reservoirs since successful operations in the Cotton Valley Sand in East 
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diseconomy of scale. A combination of drilling and fracturing activity has 
spurred unusually high levels of unconventional fuel development in regions 
throughout the United States.6 Largely as a result of this rising development, 
this country is poised to become one of the world’s largest oil producers7 and a 
major exporter of natural gas.8 The economic benefit of this relatively new 
phenomenon is staggering,9 but regulations to control the negative externalities 
of the growth unfortunately have not kept pace.10 It does not appear that the 
cumulative costs of unconventional natural gas development, in particular, 
outweigh its large benefits,11 but that is not the relevant question here. Rather, 
this Article suggests that the assumed balance between regulatory costs and 
harms of the activity has changed. In light of larger harms than those 
 
Texas in 1997.”). As described in more detail in Part I, however, these important 
technological modifications are not the primary drivers of the regulatory response that is 
needed in oil and gas. 
6 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, 
Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
145, 157-70 (2013) (exploring the benefits in depth); Department of Environmental 
Protection, Bureau of Oil and Gas Management, Wells Drilled, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/photogallery/photo13295/2010%20%
20Wells%20Drilled.gif (last updated Jan. 5, 2011) (showing 1386 Marcellus wells drilled 
and fractured in 2010); Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Oil and Gas 
Management, Wells Drilled, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT. (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.dep. 
state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Website%20Pictures/2008/2008%20Well
s%20Drilled.jpg (showing 195 Marcellus Shale wells drilled and fractured in 2008); 
Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Drilling Permits Issued, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://www rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/drillingpermitsissued.pdf (showing a rise from 38 
permits in 1993 to a peak of 4065 in 2008). Not all permits issued result in the drilling and 
fracturing of wells, of course. See Hannah Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing 
Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 732 n.6 (2013). 
7 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 106, 115 (2012) (projecting that the 
United States will produce 9.2 million barrels of oil per day by 2035, and that, out of the 
individual producing countries shown, only Russia and Saudi Arabia will achieve equally 
high production). 
8 Id. at 136 (discussing a scenario wherein U.S. gas production surpasses that of Russia 
by 2030).  
9 See, e.g., TIMOTHY W. KELSEY ET AL., MARCELLUS SHALE EDUC. & TRAINING CTR., 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MARCELLUS SHALE IN PENNSYLVANIA: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME IN 
2009, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.shaletec.org/docs/EconomicImpactFINALAugust 
28.pdf (“[T]he economic impact of Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania during 2009 ranged 
between 23,385 and 23,884 jobs, and $3.1 and $3.2 billion in that year.”); Merrill & Schizer, 
supra note 6.  
10 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 6 (describing variability among state regulations that 
address many stages of the oil and gas process and arguing that some may inadequately 
address emerging yet still uncertain risks). 
11 See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 6.  
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previously caused by oil and gas development, somewhat higher regulatory 
costs are likely merited, yet have not been implemented in many instances.12 
The regulatory lag associated with this expansion partially results from the 
tendency of policymakers, agencies, and stakeholders to rely upon dramatic 
incidents and major technological modifications – not changes in scale – as 
triggers of needed regulatory change, and neither of these triggers fully applies 
to fracturing. The oil and gas industry has used hydraulic fracturing 
technologies since the late 1940s,13 although the technologies have evolved 
over time as they have been applied to new underground formations around the 
United States – and recently at much higher rates.14 Further, there have not yet 
been many dramatic environmental catastrophes associated with this practice.15 
 
12 There is a legitimate argument that more stringent regulation would have slowed the 
expansion of fracturing in recent years. This Article does not propose, however, that we 
impose stringent regulations ex ante. Rather, it suggests that, ex ante, we must set acceptable 
thresholds for harms and the location and timing of activities, and that regulatory stringency 
must change along with the changing harms of an activity. If a particular harm threshold is 
never reached, then industry can continue growing and innovating without burdensome 
regulation. And indeed, our tolerance for harm may rise as the activity level rises and 
produces larger benefits. But having harm thresholds in place ex ante will at least force us to 
consider this question in a consistent way.  
13 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008) 
(concluding that fracturing was “[f]irst used commercially in 1949”); Jennifer L. Miskimins 
et al., The Technical Aspects of Hydraulic Fracturing, 2011 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-4 
(“In 1947, the first intentional fracture treatment took place in the Hugoton gas field of 
western Kansas.”). 
14 See supra note 5. 
15 One potentially “catastrophic” event would be the pollution of inaccessible 
groundwater with hydraulic fracturing chemicals that do not quickly break down in the 
environment. At least in one instance, the Environmental Protection Agency believes that 
fracturing in an unusually shallow formation might have caused chemicals to enter 
groundwater. DOMINIC C. DIGIULIO ET AL., EPA, EPA 600/R-00/000, DRAFT, INVESTIGATION 
OF GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING, at xiii (2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOnPavillion_Dec-8-20 
11.pdf (“[W]hen considered together with other lines of evidence, the data indicates likely 
impact to ground water that can be explained by hydraulic fracturing.”). Industry actors, 
however, dispute this report. See, e.g., Susan Phillips, Chesapeake Official Disputes EPA’s 
Report on Pavilion, [sic] Wyo., STATEIMPACT (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://stateimpact. 
npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/12/12/chesapeake-official-disputes-epas-report-on-pavilion-wyo 
(providing an email sent by a Chesapeake Energy employee that criticized various aspects 
of the EPA’s report and claiming the report demonstrates how “in [its] haste to find even 
one exception to the industry’s sterling record of responsible hydraulic fracturing, the EPA 
has compromised its well testing and data gathering protocols”). Wyoming has since taken 
over the investigation, and the EPA has suspended public comments on and peer review of 
its draft report. See Press Release, EPA, Wyoming to Lead Further Investigation of Water 
Quality Concerns Outside of Pavillion with Support of EPA (June 20, 2013), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/20ed1dfa1751192c8525735900400c30/dc7dcdb4
71dcfe1785257b90007377bf!OpenDocument; Pavillion, What’s New?, EPA (Sept. 11, 
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And the few types of dramatic events caused by oil and gas development,16 
like earthquakes and rare aquifer contamination from oil and gas waste 
disposal, have long occurred in the industry,17 albeit at a somewhat low level. 
The oil and gas industry and many regulatory agencies have thus argued that 
nothing is new,18 despite the fact that the likelihood of these rare incidents 
occurring may be rising with the increase in well numbers.19 The problem here 
is a simple yet largely unrecognized one: hydraulic fracturing has enabled the 
development of thousands of new wells in certain regions,20 thus quietly but 
substantially expanding the long-recognized harms of conventional oil and gas 
development, as well as introducing some new harms.21 
 
2013), http://www2.epa.gov/region8/pavillion (“EPA does not plan to finalize or seek peer 
review of the draft report . . . .”). For an in-depth discussion of state regulators’ conclusion 
that hydraulic fracturing has never contaminated groundwater, see Wiseman, supra note 6, 
at 739-40 (citing Unconventional Fuels, Part I: Shale Gas Potential: Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on Energy & Mineral Res. of H. Comm. on Natural Res., 111th Cong. (2009)); 
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY 
PROGRAM app. 15 (2011), available at http://www.dec ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ 
ogsgeisapp2.pdf.  
16 See infra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the pollution of the City of 
Midland’s drinking water source caused by a disposal well). 
17 See AUSTIN HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLY 
INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA FIELD, GARVIN COUNTY, 
OKLAHOMA 18 (2011), available at http://www.ogs.ou.edu/pubsscanned/openfile/OF1_2011 
.pdf (“Cases of clear anthropogenically-triggered seismicity from fluid injection are well 
documented with correlations between the number of earthquakes in an area and injection, 
specifically injection pressures, with earthquakes occurring very close to the well.”). 
18 For example, the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Commission concluded that failed well 
casing has caused groundwater contamination during the well drilling process, and further 
found that hydraulic fracturing itself has not caused contamination and does not require new 
regulation. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. This conclusion ignores the fact that 
fracturing enables more drilling, and thus might heighten the traditional risks associated 
with drilling.  
19 I have previously described many of these harms but not in the context of the 
diseconomies framework I provide here. See generally Wiseman, supra note 6.  
20 See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, FINAL NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS 
AIR POLLUTANTS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 2-15 (2012), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/oil_natural_gas_final_neshap_nsps_ria.pdf (“The 
number of wells producing natural gas wells has nearly doubled between 1990 and 2009 . . . 
.”). 
21 See, e.g., Theo Colburn et al., Natural Gas Operations from a Public Health 
Perspective, 17 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1039, 1045 (2011) (expressing 
concerns about the chemicals used in fracturing); Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, 
Water Pollution Risk Associated with Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 
RISK ANALYSIS 1382, 1384 (2012) (describing the risks of spills associated with large 
numbers of drilled and fractured wells and associated well activity); see also EPA, EPA 
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Many of the individual impacts of unconventional oil and gas development 
have long seemed benign, and often are, depending on where and when they 
occur: A bit of diesel spills from a rig at one site;22 a leaking waste pit sends 
salty brine into a small marsh at another site.23 Certain, more dramatic, harms 
also can emerge, but these are somewhat rare.24 Indeed, states have long 
regulated the effects of unconventional development,25 and in writing oil and 
gas regulations, they implicitly or explicitly assumed that the development 
would occur at a particular intensity level.26 But as the number of wells has 
rapidly expanded, thousands of once-benign effects have given way to a 
bigger, largely unaddressed problem. Increasing oil and gas activity has 
impacts that regulators appear not to have fully anticipated. Numerous 
violations of environmental and oil and gas regulations have occurred at well 
sites,27 and a recent study estimates that even in the “best-case median risk 
 
601/R-12/011, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING 
WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT 174-95 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/hf 
study/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf (listing multiple sources that describe the potential risks); 
Wiseman, supra note 6 (describing potential new risks and the possible heightening of 
familiar risks). 
22 See, e.g., Oil and Gas Compliance Report, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www. 
portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/oil_and_gas_compliance_report/20299 (follow 
“Oil and Gas Compliance Report” hyperlink; locate the “Unconventional Only (PF 
Inspections)” drop-down box and select “Yes”; enter 12/22/2010 in the “Date Inspected 
from” and “Date Inspected to” fields; navigate to page 2 and locate Well Permit 115-20298) 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (describing a self-reported twenty-gallon spill from a delivery 
truck at a Marcellus Shale (fractured) gas well site).  
23 See, e.g., Lease Facility Inspection Report, LA. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES. (Mar. 18, 
2009), http://ucmwww.dnr.state.la.us/ucmsearch/busfunctions.aspx (search for “well permit 
“238585” in left-hand box; download the lease facility inspection report from March 18, 
2009) (describing the release of salty “produced water” into a ditch and swampy area from a 
Haynesville Shale (fractured) well). 
24 See, e.g., supra note 17 (describing the acknowledged risk of oil and gas waste 
disposal wells causing earthquakes).  
25 GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS 
DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 12-16 (2009), available at http://www.gwpc.org/ 
sites/default/files/state_oil_and_gas_regulations_designed_to_protect_water_resources_0.pd
f (providing a history of state regulation). 
26 See, e.g., Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, 
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,447 (July 6, 1988) 
(concluding that, based on the examined oil and gas activity at the time and the wastes 
produced, state regulation of wastes was generally adequate, although some gaps remained, 
and also that federal regulation of oil and gas exploration and production wastes was not 
warranted).  
27 See generally Wiseman, supra note 6 (analyzing violations at well sites above shale 
and tight sandstone formations in Louisiana (providing examples out of a set of 
approximately 211 violations identified in a records request for violations from 2008 to 
2011), Michigan (providing examples out of a set of approximately 497 violations identified 
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scenario,” the volume of contaminated water from drilling and fracturing in 
just one shale formation – the Marcellus Shale beneath several mid-Atlantic 
and New England states – would contaminate a “few thousand Olympic-sized 
swimming pools” of water.28 In some cases the rate of incidents associated 
with oil and gas development – not just the total number – is increasing along 
with well numbers.29 
By expanding old harms and generating some new ones, hydraulic 
fracturing and the drilling of thousands of new wells creates three specific 
types of regulatory diseconomies of scale. First, harms with independent risks 
can accumulate. For example, we have a reasonable understanding of the risk 
of a well operator spilling fracturing or drilling materials at any one site. We 
also know that when there are 1000 rather than 100 sites in an area, more spills 
will likely occur. If existing laws already addressed spills, we might be able to 
maintain the harm/regulatory cost balance within that law with an expansion of 
enforcement efforts. But enforcement rates often do not keep pace with 
growing well numbers, whether due to agency inertia, limited budgets, or 
simple lack of political will.30 
Second, there are diseconomies with interdependent risks, in which the 
harms of an activity grow disproportionately when multiple factors converge. 
For example, when oil and gas operators in Pennsylvania tried to withdraw 
water for fracturing from the same surface water system at the same time, 
during a period of drought, their simultaneous, activity, conducted at an 
inopportune time and at relatively concentrated locations, threatened to cause 
 
in a records request for violations from 1999 to 2011), New Mexico (providing examples 
out of a set of approximately 77 violations identified in records requests and on agency 
websites from 2000 to 2011), and Texas (providing examples out of a set of approximately 
62 violations identified in a records request for violations from 2007 to 2011)). For 
approximate numbers of violations in each state discussed in that article, see spreadsheets 
sent by the agencies in response to records requests and prepared by Author and Author’s 
research assistants based on violations provided by agencies (on file with author). Note that 
these numbers are not comprehensive for New Mexico – we identified only a limited 
number of violations, many of them spills, at tight sands sites. For similar data on violations 
in Pennsylvania, see Oil and Gas Compliance Report, supra note 22 (follow “Oil and Gas 
Compliance Report” hyperlink; select “Yes” under “Unconventional Only” and “Inspections 
with Violations Only”; in “Date Inspected From” type 01/01/2008; in “Date Inspected To” 
type 12/31/2013; select “View Report”) (showing approximately 4638 violations in 
Pennsylvania at unconventional (fractured) wells in the Marcellus shale from 2008 to 2013). 
28 See Rozell & Reaven, supra note 21, at 1391. 
29 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Fatalities Among Oil and Gas Extraction 
Workers – United States, 2003-2006, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 425, 429-30 
(2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5716.pdf (“A statistically 
significant correlation was observed between the number of drilling and workover rigs and 
the annual occupational fatality rate during 1993-2006 . . . .”). 
30 See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text (describing potentially declining 
enforcement in Texas despite large numbers of new Barnett Shale wells drilled).  
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dangerously low water levels.31 The growth in well numbers makes this type of 
interdependent problem more likely by raising the likelihood of higher well 
densities, more development activity at a given time, and activity that pushes 
into sensitive environmental areas. Oil and gas waste disposal wells in 
seismically unstable areas have caused small earthquakes,32 and one disposal 
well near an aquifer contaminated a city’s drinking water source.33 Two 
hundred of these same wells might have produced negligible harms elsewhere. 
As oil and gas operators search for more disposal options and states rush to 
permit more disposal wells,34 however, the risk of developing any one well 
near a fragile area – and of associated interdependent effects – rises. 
Finally, there are unevenly distributed harms in which the externalities of 
expanding development concentrate in certain areas. The channeling of certain 
oil and gas wastes to particular states has raised this issue – with operators in 
Pennsylvania sending most liquid waste from gas wells to Ohio, for example.35 
This subjects certain communities to more road damage, traffic congestion, 
and air pollution. 
Powerful regulatory diseconomies of scale also arise in areas beyond oil and 
gas, and they help to explain major regulatory failures. Under the Clean Air 
Act, auto manufacturers must install pollution control technologies and 
 
31 See infra note 265 and accompanying text. I am grateful to Tracey George for her 
suggestions on how to best conceptualize risks.  
32 OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NORTHSTAR 1 CLASS II 
INJECTION WELL AND THE SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, AREA 17 (2012), 
available at http://media.cleveland.com/business_impact/other/UICReport.pdf (concluding 
that a disposal well likely induced seismic activity); Katie M. Keranen et al., Potentially 
Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between Wastewater Injection and the 2011 
Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, GEOLOGY (Mar. 26, 2013), http://geology.gsapubs.org/ 
content/early/2013/03/26/G34045.1 full.pdf.  
33 City of Midland’s Motion for Estimation of Claims for Purpose of Allowance, Voting, 
and Determining Plan Feasibility, and Request for Determination that Remediation Claim Is 
Entitled to Administrative Expense Priority at 2, In re Heritage Consolidated LLC, No. 10-
36484-hdh-11 (Bankr. D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter City of Midland]. 
34 See, e.g., Industry Guidance, W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Gas Well 
Drilling/Completion, Large Water Volume Fracture Treatments 4 (Jan. 8, 2010), available 
at http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-and-gas/GI/Documents/Marcellus%20Guidance%201-8-10% 
20Final.pdf (“[T]o handle the expected amount of water [from fractured oil and gas wells], 
many additional UIC wells will need to be permitted, drilled or converted.”). 
35 See, e.g., Rick McCurdy, Senior Eng’g Advisor, Chesapeake Energy, Underground 
Injection Wells for Produced Water Disposal, Presentation at the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Technical Workshop 23 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/21_ 
McCurdy_-_UIC_Disposal_508.pdf (mentioning produced water “being trucked (or railed) 
to Ohio and West Virginia”); see also EPA, EPA 600/R-11/048, PROCEEDING OF THE 
TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS FOR THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STUDY: WATER RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 5, 83 (2011), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
documents/HF_Workshop_4_Proceedings_FINAL_508.pdf. 
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increase the fuel economy of certain vehicles,36 but growing numbers of cars 
on the road and miles driven threaten to render these individual controls 
ineffective.37 The Clean Water Act suffers from a similar problem with 
nonpoint sources of pollution – millions of new lawns, golf courses, and farms 
send nutrients into regional water bodies and dwarf pollution reductions from 
large industrial sources.38 These “small harms” recognized by Professor Dave 
Owen and William Odum tend to be independent ones that can accumulate.39 
Yet they also can cause interdependent effects: Air pollution emitted within a 
valley on sunny days can have large impacts,40 as can nutrients and bacteria 
sent to surface waters during periods of warm weather.41 
Our system of public law could avoid these failures, which emerge when 
activities grow and create cumulative, interdependent, and unevenly distributed 
harms. Legislatures or agencies could first identify an acceptable cumulative 
threshold of harm caused by a particular activity that would not change 
regardless of whether one or one thousand actors contribute, although 
policymakers or agencies could modify the threshold if preferences regarding 
 
36 40 C.F.R. § 600.001 (2013) (providing fuel economy standards for “2008 and later 
model year automobiles”); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor 
Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 
6698, 6701 (Feb. 10, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80, 85, 86) (“Under the program, 
automakers will produce vehicles designed to have very low emissions when operated on 
low-sulfur gasoline . . . .”). 
37 See, e.g., MARICOPA ASS’N OF GOV’TS, EIGHT-HOUR OZONE REDESIGNATION REQUEST 
AND MAINTENANCE PLAN FOR THE MARICOPA NONATTAINMENT AREA, at ES-7 to -9 (2009) 
(describing how mobile sources are the largest contributor to nitrogen oxide emissions); 
Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution Under 
the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 20 (1996) (observing that 
precursor chemicals from automobiles were the “the predominant source of transported 
ozone in many nonattainment areas”); Mobile Sources, CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. 
PROT., http://www.ct.gov/dep/cwp/view.asp?a=2684&Q=322142&depNav_GID=1619 (last 
updated June 20, 2013) (“Mobile source pollution accounts for approximately fifty percent 
of all man-made air pollution emitted in Connecticut and throughout the Northeast.”).  
38 See EPA, EPA 841-R-001, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, 2004 REPORTING CYCLE: FINDINGS 16, 23 (2009), available at http://water.epa. 
gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/upload/2009_01_22_305b_2004report_2004_305Breport.
pdf (showing agriculture as the leading source of stream impairment and “unspecified 
nonpoint sources” as the fourth largest source of impairment in bays and estuaries). 
39 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
40 See Ground-Level Ozone, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/glo/basic html (last updated July 
30, 2013) (“Ozone is likely to reach unhealthy levels on hot sunny days in urban 
environments.”). 
41 Summer’s Warm Weather Can Spur Blue-Green Algae Blooms, WIS. DEP’T OF 
NATURAL RES. (July 30, 2013), http://dnr.wi.gov/news/Weekly/Article_Lookup.asp?id=26 
48 (“When conditions are favorable, usually in summer, the number of algae can increase 
dramatically.”).  
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total acceptable harm changed.42 Additionally, more localized thresholds 
would account for interdependent and unevenly distributed impacts: these 
would limit the areas into which the activity could expand and identify the 
times, such as periods of drought, when collective activities might have 
particularly large impacts. Once the thresholds were set, they would provide 
the needed benchmarks for regulation: controls on individual actors would 
vary depending on how close these actors came to reaching collective and 
localized harm thresholds. 
Tailoring laws and regulations to address diseconomies of scale will not be 
adequate, though; institutions also will have to change in ways that anticipate 
potential diseconomies and respond to them more quickly. Legislatures could 
incorporate sunset provisions in agency enabling statutes that would be tied to 
the levels of activity the agency regulated, requiring review of the agency’s 
mission and quality of performance at certain activity thresholds. This would 
better ensure that agencies did not remain stuck within old laws and missions, 
and would give these institutions needed authority to address the new and 
expanded risks associated with scale-based change. Legislatures also could 
create mandatory minimum agency staffing levels that would automatically 
rise as the regulated actors reached specified thresholds of activity. In the event 
that a growing activity caused interdependent effects – thus requiring 
disproportionately more funding than could be provided by a larger number of 
actors paying for permits – agencies could fund this expansion through 
permitting fees that rose as the quantity of activity expanded. 
A few laws do incorporate these types of scaling concepts, although not 
fully. For example, the Clean Air Act sets acceptable levels of pollution in the 
ambient air using health-based standards.43 The Act then imposes more 
stringent controls on industrial sources in regions that exceed this level and 
thus have relatively dirty air.44 The Clean Water Act, too, requires states to 
 
42 Indeed, because growing regulated activities often have substantial economic benefits, 
people’s tolerance for the harm caused by the activity might rise along with the growth of 
the activity. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2006) (requiring the EPA Administrator to identify “each air 
pollutant—(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution that 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare” when listing 
pollutants for which national ambient air quality standards are to be established); id. § 
7409(b) (“National primary ambient air quality standards . . . shall be ambient air quality 
standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator . . . 
are requisite to protect the public health.”). 
44 See id. § 7502(a)(1)(A) (allowing the EPA Administrator to “consider such factors as 
the severity of nonattainment . . . and the availability and feasibility of the pollution control 
measures that the Administrator believes may be necessary to provide for attainment”); id. § 
7503(a)(2) (requiring “lowest achievable emission rate” technology for new and modified 
major sources in nonattainment areas). In the context of enforcing laws as the number of 
regulated actors rises, the Food and Drug Administration also operates under a statutory 
regime that at least partially recognizes scale, allowing for an “annual adjustment of 
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develop water quality standards, and mandatory permitting of individual 
sources of water pollution accounts for these standards to some extent.45 Thus, 
water pollution sources located near thousands of other sources emitting into 
one lake are likely to face more stringent controls.46 Further, some states have 
sunset review requirements for certain agencies, including some oil and gas 
commissions; these provisions require the agencies to describe the number of 
inspections made, the number of wells regulated, and other activities.47 This, in 
turn, might spur more careful investigation of the adequacy of the agencies’ 
coverage. Yet scale-based approaches within laws and institutional design 
seem to be surprisingly rare in most areas – even in environmental and natural 
resources law. 
This Article argues that regulatory diseconomies of scale should trigger 
major modifications of policies and statutes as well as institutional change, 
and, relatedly, that regulatory systems and institutions should be designed with 
potential regulatory diseconomies (or economies) of scale in mind. Part I 
 
revenues each year beginning in FY 2009 for increases in workload for the process of the 
review of human drug applications.” PDUFA IV 5-Year Financial Plan (2008): 
Assumptions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/Prescription 
DrugUserFee/ucm153481.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (2012) (directing the achievement of effluent limitations 
for point sources, which include “any more stringent limitation [than the best practicable 
control technology required for most point sources], including those necessary to meet water 
quality standards”). 
46 EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976) 
(“Water quality standards are retained as a supplementary basis for effluent limitations, 
however, so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent 
limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable 
levels.” (emphasis added)), superseded on other grounds by statute, Clean Water Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323), as 
recognized in Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 1988). 
47 See infra note 199 and accompanying text. I distinguish sunset reviews from other 
sunset provisions or temporary legislation, which are “clauses that cause legislation to 
expire by its own terms.” Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1009 n.4 (2011); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 
259 n.64 (2007) (describing “sunset” legislation and review generally as including clauses 
that “required periodic review in order to continue the legal validity of a regulatory agency” 
or “review of all agencies with responsibility for a class of regulation” in a definition similar 
to the one that I use for review); id. at 260 (indicating that sunset legislation programs 
“enact programs for finite time periods”). Although these provisions have since fallen out of 
favor, unlike temporary legislation, see id. at 259-60, they remain important, particularly in 
certain states. The sunset reviews that I describe as positive examples, in that they might 
force agencies to consider scaling impacts. But they do not directly address changes in the 
quantity of regulated activity because they typically require sunset reviews after the agency 
has operated for a certain number of years. Requiring review based on time may roughly 
capture expansions in scale – within a particular ten-year period, oil and gas development 
may have substantially expanded within a state – but it is not a perfect proxy.  
  
2014] REMEDYING REGULATORY DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 249 
 
explores three particular types of diseconomies of scale, including 
independent, interdependent, and uneven expansions of harm, and associated 
regulatory lag. It argues that the growth of oil and gas development strongly 
exhibits all three types of diseconomies and briefly describes how this problem 
arises in other areas of environmental law. Part II then suggests how 
policymakers and agencies can create better institutions and laws that 
specifically identify regulatory diseconomies of scale and address scale-based 
concerns in all three scaling scenarios. 
Although this Article focuses on addressing only the negative aspects of the 
growth of regulated activity, the expansion of regulated activity often is highly 
beneficial, and sometimes can lead to fewer harms. For example, because 
water is scarce and waste disposal options are limited, the growing oil and gas 
industry is developing recycling strategies for wastewater.48 Here, increasing 
regulated activity could result in important innovations and a need for less 
regulation of water use and disposal. Just as legislatures and agencies should 
anticipate changing scale and set harm thresholds at which regulation and 
agency resources should be ratcheted up, public law sometimes will need to 
evolve in the opposite direction. The Article concludes by exploring briefly 
how our system of public law should anticipate changing harms in both 
directions, thus causing regulations to expand and constrict along with the 
activities and harms to which they apply. 
I. UNDERSTANDING DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
The common element in all regulatory diseconomies of scale is a baseline of 
initial regulation – the point in time at which policymakers or agencies write 
relatively comprehensive controls to address the harms of an activity. At this 
point, those tasked with regulating assume that the activity will occur at a 
particular scale49 and will thus generate a certain level of harm; the merits of 
 
48 See, e.g., Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 5 (describing wastewater 
recycling pilot projects). 
49 See, e.g., Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, 
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,446 (July 6, 1988) 
(examining waste volumes and their toxicity in a decision exempting many oil and gas 
wastes – even those with hazardous constituents – from the hazardous waste portion of a 
federal solid waste statute, and documenting only “62 damage cases”). Regulatory impact 
analyses that assess the effects of the proposed rule often project future volumes of activity, 
though regulation does not always formally allow consideration of these analyses (for 
example, where costs may not be considered). See EPA, supra note 20, at 2-26 (forecasting 
future well drilling activity in a regulatory impact analysis of new Clean Air Act regulations 
on fractured oil and gas wells). This Article argues that projections of future volume often 
are not adequately factored into the calculus behind the actual rule chosen, as perhaps 
shown most clearly by the 1988 exemption. Further, regulatory impact analyses often fail to 
accurately predict expansions in scale; five years ago, even the best scientists could not have 
anticipated the current rate of oil or gas development, because the actual productivity of a 
formation is often not known until several years of drilling activity have passed. As 
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imposing regulatory costs in order to control these harms are calculated 
accordingly. From this point of relative equilibrium, the regulated activity, 
which often is somewhat benign at a small scale, becomes more common – 
sometimes rapidly – leading to a variety of disproportionate harms. These 
diseconomies cause and are exacerbated by regulatory failures,50 including the 
failures of enabling legislation, regulation, and agencies to fully recognize or 
resolve the diseconomies by either addressing them in the initial baseline law 
or by later modifying the laws to account for scale-based change. There are 
three specific manifestations of this phenomenon, including independent, 
interdependent, and unevenly distributed harms, and recent failures in 
environmental and natural resources law best exemplify these three problems. 
A. Unconventional Oil and Gas Development 
The boom in fossil fuel production from unconventional formations far 
below U.S. soil is the most powerful recent example of a regulatory 
diseconomy of scale, exhibiting all three types of harms as the activity has 
expanded rapidly in recent years. The United States has a long history of fossil 
fuel extraction,51 and states have controlled onshore extraction for nearly a 
century52 without receiving much attention from the public.53 Energy 
companies recently discovered, however, that they could apply a long-used 
extraction process,54 with certain technological modifications,55 to shale and 
 
discussed below, despite being unable to accurately predict changes in scale, it is important 
to initially factor the likelihood of scalar change into regulatory approaches and institutional 
design in order to ensure more rapid, nimble, and effective responses when scale-based 
changes occur. 
50 Diseconomies of scale are often simply regulatory failures to respond to problems 
caused by the as yet unidentified trigger of scale, but “regulatory failure” is too narrow of a 
term. As described in detail below, in some cases, agencies cannot adequately respond to a 
scalar increase because of legislation that limits their jurisdiction and their ability to hire 
staff. 
51 See LOUIS STOTZ & ALEXANDER JAMISON, HISTORY OF THE GAS INDUSTRY 76 (1938) 
(pinpointing August 27, 1859 as the date on which oil was struck in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania); C.A. WARNER, TEXAS OIL AND GAS SINCE 1543, at 22 (2007) (dating the first 
“real oil well completed in Texas” to 1866). 
52 See, e.g., GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 12-13 (explaining that, 
while “New York required the plugging of abandoned wells as early as 1879,” more 
comprehensive regulatory efforts for the conservation of oil and gas began in 1935, 
followed by environmental regulations beginning in the 1970s). 
53 Attention generally focused intermittently on offshore drilling and associated activity, 
including the Exxon Valdez tanker spill and the BP Macondo well blowout and spill. 
54 See Miskimins, supra note 13, at 1-4 (explaining that energy companies have used 
hydraulic fracturing for more than sixty years). The slickwater fracturing now used in shale 
and tight sandstone is a more recent development. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.  
55 See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 5 (describing changes in gel- and water-based 
fracturing techniques). 
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tight sandstone formations thousands of feet underground that trap massive 
quantities of gas and oil. As the economic benefits of this practice have 
exploded, so, too, have the environmental harms – largely due to scaling 
problems. As introduced previously, this Article does not argue that the total 
costs of oil and gas development outweigh its larger economic, social, and in 
some cases, environmental56 benefits, but rather that the regulatory costs of 
this practice are disproporationately low in light of scale-based harms, and that 
certain regulation must expand. 
The entities responsible for developing unconventional wells, called well 
“operators,” command a small and temporary57 yet intensive industrial 
operation to drill and fracture each well. After testing for the presence of gas 
and acquiring property rights and permits, an operator builds a well site and 
access road to the site, where all of the drilling activity will occur.58 The 
operator brings water, drilling materials, rigs, trailers, and other equipment and 
materials to the site,59 and then begins the drilling process. In many of the 
shale and tight sandstone formations currently being developed, operators drill 
thousands of feet below ground,60 applying various fluids and muds as they cut 
through layers or rock. 
Following the drilling process and initial disposal of drilling wastes, the 
operator hydraulically fractures the well. As part of a modified fracturing 
practice developed in the 1990s and now commonly used,61 the operator 
withdraws millions of gallons of water from either surface waters or an 
underground aquifer.62 The operator then trucks chemicals to the site and 
 
56 See, e.g., David Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of 
Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 440-42 (2013) (describing the displacement of 
coal-fired power plants with gas and the lower conventional and greenhouse gas emissions 
from gas-fired plants).  
57 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING 
REGULATORY PROGRAM 5-139 (2011), available at http://www.dec ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeis 
full0911.pdf (describing production equipment that remains at the well pad, including 
pressure control equipment). 
58 Id. at 5-6 to 5-8. 
59 See NAT’L PARK SERV., DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL GAS RESOURCE IN THE 
MARCELLUS SHALE 9 (2009), available at http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/resources/PDFs/ 
marcellusshalereport09.pdf (showing the equipment on site). 
60 See HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE, 
UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 3-5 (2008), available at http://www halliburton.com/public/ 
solutions/contents/shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf (describing drilling and fracturing 
depths). 
61 See David F. Martineau, Expansion of the Barnett Shale Play Fort Worth Basin – 
Texas, 2004 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5-10 (describing the first slick water frac in 1997 in 
Texas). 
62 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 5-93 to 5-94 
(estimating that between 2.4 and 7.8 million gallons of water are used for each horizontal 
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stores them there temporarily, mixes these chemicals with the water, and 
injects this mixture down the well at high pressure to crack the shale or tight 
sandstone formation and facilitate the release of gas or oil.63 Some of the 
fracturing fluid flows back up out of the well as “flowback” waste, which is 
also stored in a surface pit or tank, and then disposed of through a wastewater 
treatment plant, injection into an underground disposal well, or reuse at another 
fracturing job.64 
After the well is completed and secured for long-term production, waste in 
the form of natural “produced water” from the formation comes out of the well 
over its production life.65 This water contains high levels of salts66 and, often, 
low levels of naturally occurring radioactive substances.67 The operator stores 
the waste in a pit or tank on the surface of the well site, and, as with flowback, 
the operator disposes of the waste through underground injection, reuse, or a 
wastewater treatment plant.68 
States have primary regulatory control over most of these activities. They 
require each operator to limit and contain erosion at well sites while they 
construct the site and access road.69 At the drilling stage, operators must install 
strong steel lining within wells; this “casing” prevents oil and gas from seeping 
from the wells into aquifers below ground.70 States also require that operators 
 
fractured well). 
63 Id. at 5-5 (“The proppant holds the fractures open, allowing hydrocarbons to flow into 
the wellbore after injected fluids are recovered.”). 
64 EPA, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON 
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 48 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/HF_ 
Study__Plan_110211_FINAL_508.pdf (“Underground injection is the primary method for 
disposal in all major gas shale plays, except the Marcellus Shale.”). 
65 See Joseph Dancy, Solid Waste Management and Environmental Regulation of 
Commonly Encountered Oil Field Wastes, 35A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. SPECIAL INST. 5-17 to 
5-19 (1994) (describing produced water).  
66 Id. at 5-17 (describing an average total dissolved solids level that “exceeds the solids 
content of seawater”).  
67 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 6-205 
(“[P]roduction brine is known to contain elevated NORM levels.”).  
68 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-156, ENERGY-WATER NEXUS: INFORMATION 
ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER PRODUCED DURING OIL AND GAS 
PRODUCTION 14 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587522.pdf (observing 
that “underground injection is the predominant practice” for disposing of produced water, 
but that discharging it to surface waters, irrigating crops, allowing it to dry in pits, and 
recycling it for hydraulic fracturing also occurs). 
69 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012); Authorization Status for EPA’s Stormwater Construction 
and Industrial Programs, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/authorizationstatus. 
cfm (last updated Sept. 10, 2013). 
70 See Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas Development, 
Including Hydraulic Fracturing 49-63 (Ctr. for Global Energy, Int’l Arbitration & Envtl. 
Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1953547 (describing regulations of casing in sixteen states and collecting 
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store drilling and other wastes in pits or tanks to prevent pollution at the 
surface,71 and that they follow certain approved disposal methods.72 
Historically, these regulations have been relatively effective.73 With wells 
doubling or tripling in number over the past few years, however,74 the harms of 
drilling and fracturing have become more apparent.75 The modified type of 
fracturing technology used by operators has introduced some new risks, but the 
bulk of the problems appear to arise at the more common stages of the well 
development process – during drilling and the storage and disposal of wastes.76 
1. Independent-Probability Risks that Accumulate 
Many of these stages of the drilling and fracturing process have caused 
independent harms associated with diseconomies of scale, in which harms 
appear to increase relatively evenly as the activity expands. For harms with 
independent risks, such as the likelihood of a spill occurring at a site or a well 
being improperly cased, the probability of an incident occurring at any one 
shale gas or oil site has not, in many cases, risen substantially. Yet when one 
multiplies this risk by nearly 2000, as in Pennsylvania,77 or by more than 
16,000, as in the case of north central Texas,78 more incidents are likely to 
occur. The risks of chemical or waste spills, air pollution, improper disposal of 
waste, and other incidents have grown simply because there are more wells in a 
given area.79 Improperly lined wells sometimes leak methane during drilling, 
 
sources). 
71 See id. at 106-11. 
72 See id. at 112-24.  
73 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at app. 15 (describing 
multiple statements by state regulators indicating that fracturing had never contaminated 
groundwater). 
74 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
75 See, e.g., EPA, supra note 64 (responding, in 2011, to a 2009 request from Congress 
that the EPA study the risks of fracturing to groundwater). 
76 See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 751 (assessing violations of state laws at drilled and 
fractured well sites in recent years and observing those that have been the most common). 
77 See Bureau of Oil & Gas Mgmt., Wells Drilled, 2011 January-November, PA. DEP’T 
ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/2011%20Wells%20 
Drilled.gif (last updated Dec. 5, 2011) (showing 1751 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in 
2011).  
78 See Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Field Discovery Date – 10-15-1981, R.R. COMM’N 
OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/fielddata/barnettshale.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) 
(describing 16,346 Barnett Shale gas wells “on RRC records and additional permitted 
locations”). 
79 But see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-732, OIL AND GAS: INFORMATION ON 
SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS 4 
(2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647791.pdf (“The risks identified in the 
studies and publications we reviewed cannot, at present, be quantified . . . .”). 
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contaminating basements, water wells, and nearby springs.80 Diesel from 
drilling or rigs and trucks occasionally spills at well sites or along access roads 
– sometimes entering nearby surface waters.81 Produced water and other 
drilling wastes similarly spill as they are being transferred from the well,82 or 
they leak from storage pits and tanks.83 Operators at sites around the country 
also have spilled fracturing fluids and flowback,84 and flowback storage units 
have, collectively, leaked thousands of gallons of wastes.85 
Above the surface, higher levels of drilling and fracturing activity release 
more air pollution in a particular region than would be emitted from less 
concentrated wells;86 rigs and other diesel equipment operating at the surface 
emit nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, and other pollutants;87 and the 
fracturing process and flowback water send volatile organic compounds into 
the air.88 Wells and pipelines carrying gas from the site also emit methane, a 
 
80 See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water 
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
8172, 8175 (2011), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/02/1100682108. 
full.pdf+html (identifying “leaky gas well casings” as a “possible mechanism” for “fluid 
[and methane] migration into . . . shallow drinking-water aquifers”); Wiseman, supra note 6, 
at 778-82 (describing methane leakage incidents identified in public records requests). 
81 See, e.g., Oil and Gas Compliance Report, supra note 22 (locate Well Permit 115-
20293 in search results) (reporting that at a Marcellus Shale site, after two fuel tank trucks 
collided at the page entrance “[t]he fuel tank was damaged and leaked approximately 15 
gallons of diesel fuel”); OCD Permitting Spill Search, N.M. OIL CONSERVATION DIV., https: 
//wwwapps.emnrd.state nm.us/ocd/ocdpermitting/Data/Incidents/SpillSearchResults.aspx?A
pi=30-039-30557 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (describing a fuel pump split at a tight 
sandstones well site that released 1000 gallons of diesel, 100 of which were later recovered). 
82 See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 799-801 (describing produced water spills).  
83 See, e.g., OCD Permitting: 30-039-25947, N.M. OIL CONSERVATION DIV., https://www 
apps.emnrd.state nm.us/ocd/ocdpermitting/Data/WellDetails.aspx?api=30-039-25947 (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2013) (stating that 142 barrels of produced water spilled from a production 
tank and seventy barrels were recovered); see also Wiseman, supra note 6, at 788-92 
(describing leaks from pits and tanks). 
84 See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 766-70 (describing flowback spills). 
85 See id. (concluding that the spills, measured in barrels and gallons, collectively amount 
to thousands of gallons). 
86 See, e.g., Air Emissions Requirements for Oil and Gas Industry, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. 
HEALTH & ENV’T, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=CDPHE-
AP%2FCBONLayout&cid=1251597643322&pagename=CBONWrapper (last visited Oct. 
8, 2013) (making note of “emissions of volatile organic compounds [from oil and gas 
condensate tanks] that contribute to the formation of ozone,” and targeting these emissions 
in the Front Range ozone nonattainment area and throughout the state).  
87 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 6-100 (showing 
nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, and other emissions from engines used at well sites). 
88 EPA, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO AIR REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
INDUSTRY: FACT SHEET 2, available at http://epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728fact 
sheet.pdf (“During a stage of well completion known as ‘flowback,’ fracturing fluids, water, 
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potent greenhouse gas.89 The more these types of activities occur, the larger the 
collective harms. 
Because these sorts of environmental impacts have long occurred at oil and 
gas sites, many regulations already address them. For example, states require 
spill control and response plans that instruct operators to train employees to 
prevent spills and to clean spills up quickly when they do occur.90 Many states 
also specify that surface pits containing oil and gas wastes must be lined to 
prevent the pits from leaking,91 or, more rarely, that wastes must be stored in 
watertight tanks rather than in pits.92 
As discussed in more detail in Part II, despite existing laws that address 
many of the independent probability risks of expanding oil and gas 
development, agency design often has prevented states from enforcing these 
regulations at even rates. As well numbers rise, inspectors might not be able to 
visit as many new sites and might fail to issue fines or orders to remediate sites 
where incidents occur.93 Indeed, although some states like Ohio and 
Pennsylvania have expanded staffing levels in response to the boom,94 staffing 
 
and reservoir gas come to the surface at a high velocity and volume. This mixture includes a 
high volume of VOCs and methane, along with air toxics such as benzene, ethylbenzene and 
n-hexane.”). 
89 For estimates of methane leakage, see, for example, David T. Allen et al., 
Measurements of Methane Emissions at Natural Gas Production Sites in the United States, 
110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17768, 17769 (2013), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2013/ 
09/10/1304880110 full.pdf; Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane 
Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6435, 6438 (2012); 
Gabrielle Pétron et al., Hydrocarbon Emissions Characterization in the Colorado Front 
Range: A Pilot Study, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Feb. 2012, at 1, 13-17.  
90 See Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 70, at 95-98 (describing spill requirements and 
collecting sources). 
91 See id. at 108-09. 
92 Id. (showing that some states require or have proposed to require tanks). 
93 See, e.g., Edward McCallister, Insight: NY Water at Risk from Lack of Natgas 
Inspectors?, REUTERS (July 29, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://www reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/ 
us-newyork-shale-drilling-idUSTRE76S5FA20110729 (“[T]he [New York] state 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) has only 14 well inspectors to oversee 
13,000 wells. With staff and budget constraints, the agency will struggle to keep up with the 
flood of drilling applications expected from companies keen to develop untapped reserves 
should the state lift its ban.”); Email from Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, Railroad 
Commission of Tex. to author, Feb. 27, 2012, 9:01 AM (responding to the Author’s 
question regarding why, in the violation data the Author received, there were “fewer 
enforcements for the end of 2009 through 2011” as compared to 2008). The email 
explained: “[The Commission] underwent a hiring freeze beginning in 2009 and lost 
personnel. Legal Enforcement was down two attorneys and field operations was also short 
of personnel.” Id. 
94 See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE: TOUGH REGULATIONS, GREATER 
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2013), available at http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/ 
Document-95071/0130-FS-DEP4288.pdf (“Throughout 2009 and 2010, DEP more than 
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numbers have remained relatively level in states like Louisiana95 where 
thousands of new wells are being developed.96 
2. Interdependent Harms 
A number of incidents in unconventional gas development appear to involve 
activity that expands rapidly in certain regions. As well numbers grow, several 
risks emerge that grow interdependently; like other systemic risks,97 they 
become disproportionately large due to a confluence of certain events. 
For example, as wells become denser, they might be drilled at the same time 
and during certain weather conditions; these factors of density, location, and 
timing can converge to cause substantial harms. This is most apparent in the 
context of water withdrawals for hydraulic fracturing. Well operators cannot 
fully control when fracturing will occur – they must wait until they have 
properly drilled and tested the well, and for the contractor who conducts 
fracturing operations to arrive at the site.98 If conditions combine to cause a 
large number of wells to be fractured in one area at the same time, numerous 
operators might withdraw water from one surface source – driving trucks to a 
river, inserting a hose, and pumping out water at high rates.99 This activity 
could remove the last increment of water volume necessary to protect certain 
 
doubled the number of inspectors. In 2011 and 2012, DEP conducted more inspections of oil 
and gas well sites than ever before.”); ODNR Hiring 70 Employees to Regulate Shale Wells, 
WOUB PUB. MEDIA (May 8, 2012, 4:47 PM), http://woub.org/2012/05/08/odnr-hiring-70-
employees-regulate-shale-wells (“The Ohio Department of Natural Resources says it is 
hiring 70 more employees to regulate an increase in oil and gas drilling.”). 
95 See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Risks in Tight Oil and Gas Development, 29 NAT. 
GAS & ELECTRICITY 6, 8 (2012) (showing the number of Louisiana inspectors and providing 
sources for this information). 
96 Louisiana State Oil and Gas Drilling Permits Issued by Type, LA. DEP’T OF NATURAL 
RES., http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/TAD/data/facts_and_figures/table22 htm (last updated 
Aug. 25, 2013) (showing spikes in well permits issued from 2005 to 2008). 
97 David M. Driesen, Climate Disruption: An Economic Dynamic Approach, 42 ENVTL. 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,639, 10,640 (2012) (defining systemic risks in the climate 
context as involving a “serious disturbance in fundamental physical systems”); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining “systemic risk” in a 
financial context as “(i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers 
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or 
(Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost 
of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market 
price volatility,” but strictly limiting this to an “economic, not a political definition” used 
only to describe very limited types of financial risk). 
98 See, e.g., Policy on Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids, CABOT OIL & GAS CORP., http://www 
.cabotog.com/pdfs/Frackingfluidpolicy.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (describing Cabot’s 
requirements for its contractors who conduct hydraulic fracturing). 
99 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 6-2 (“Water for 
hydraulic fracturing may be obtained by withdrawing it from surface water bodies or new or 
existing water-supply wells drilled into aquifers.”). 
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species in the stream.100 This type of concern led one regional regulatory 
agency in Pennsylvania to shut down a number of fracturing operations during 
a period of summer drought101 – in part because the agency has an unusual 
scale-based regulation that includes a harm threshold.102 If states do not 
adequately monitor activity conducted at a particular time, they risk missing 
these types of interdependent harms. Indeed, in a regulatory system that 
demonstrates the inertia created by regulations with an inadequate harm-
regulatory balance, some states currently do not even regulate water 
withdrawals. It appears that states fail to regulate in part because when they 
initially address potential harms from this activity, they assume de minimis 
impacts (particularly for small, individual water withdrawals);103 water 
withdrawals for fracturing quickly eviscerate this assumption. 
Denser oil and gas wells within a particular region also could be developed 
closer to fragile or unstable environments as total well numbers grow, causing 
another type of interdependent harm – one that differs depending on the 
environment in which the activity is conducted. The regional Delaware River 
Basin Commission worries, for example, that in the Delaware River watershed, 
well site construction and operation, as well as the equipment required for the 
extraction of water for fracturing, will send harmful sediment into the Basin’s 
“Special Protection Waters.”104 Other stages of the well development process, 
including disposal of wastes, can also generate disproportionate harms due to 
their location. As introduced previously, in Texas, a disposal well that accepted 
thousands of gallons of salty oil and gas wastes from wells in the Crittendon 
 
100 Cf. Natural Gas and Wildlife, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www fws.gov/north 
east/EcologicalServices/energygas html (last updated May 22, 2012) (“[W]ater withdrawals 
from certain streams and rivers, or at certain times of year, can harm aquatic species, 
including federally listed freshwater mussels.”).  
101 Press Release, Susquehanna River Basin Comm’n, 64 Water Withdrawals for Natural 
Gas Drilling and Other Uses Suspended to Protect Streams (July 16, 2012), available at http 
://www.srbc.net/newsroom/NewsRelease.aspx?NewsReleaseID=90 (“64 separate water 
withdrawals approved by SRBC are suspended due to lower streamflow levels in the 
Susquehanna basin.”).  
102 Id. (“Under SRBC’s passby flow restrictions, when streams drop to predetermined 
protected low flow levels, operators who are required to meet the agency’s passby 
requirement must stop taking water.”). 
103 See State Water Withdrawal Regulations, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/state-water-withdrawal-regulations.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2013) (summarizing state regulations and showing that some states do not regulate 
withdrawals deemed “insignificant”). Most withdrawals for fracturing will exceed the 
significance threshold, but in states that do not require permits at all – even for large 
withdrawals of water – the activity remains unregulated. Id. 
104 DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS § 7.4(d) 
(proposed Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.state nj.us/drbc/library/documents/natural 
gas-REVISEDdraftregs110811.pdf (describing proposed safeguards to control the amount 
of sediment that enters “Special Protection Waters”). 
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Field (for which it is not clear whether the wells were fractured), leaked waste 
into the City of Midland’s nearby drinking water aquifer, polluting billions of 
gallons of water.105 Similar disposal wells in Ohio, which accepted waste from 
fractured wells in Pennsylvania and Ohio, were located in seismically unstable 
zones and caused small earthquakes.106 Disposal wells have induced seismic 
activity in other states,107 yet Ohio and Arkansas appear to be the only states to 
have updated their disposal well construction requirements. Ohio requires 
formal consideration of seismic data and continuous monitoring of disposal 
wells post-construction,108 and Arkansas has placed a moratorium on 
permanent disposal wells in certain unstable areas.109 
Finally, interdependent effects in drilling and fracturing also emerge due to 
reliance on pollution treatment technologies that cannot adequately treat wastes 
above a certain threshold. Pollution control technologies have physical limits: 
they capture and treat certain types and quantities of pollutants; pollution that 
exceeds these physical limits is released, untreated, into the environment.110 As 
gas drilling boomed in Pennsylvania, the sheer quantity of chemical-laden 
wastewaters produced threatened to cause this type of threshold effect at 
wastewater treatment plants,111 although it is still not clear whether waste 
caused any measurable environmental problems.112 The state does not have 
 
105 City of Midland, supra note 33. 
106 OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., supra note 32, at 3 (“A number of coincidental 
circumstances appear to make a compelling argument for the recent Youngstown-area 
seismic events to have been induced . . . .”). 
107 See Keranen et al., supra note 32.  
108 Youngstown FAQ, OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES. 2, http://ohiodnr.com/downloads/ 
northstar/YoungstownFAQ.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
109 178-00-001 ARK. CODE R. pt. H, r. H-1(s)(2) (LexisNexis 2012); Permanent Disposal 
Well Moratorium Area, ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N (June 20, 2011), http://www.aogc.state.ar. 
us/notices/Ex.%201B%20-Permanent%20Disposal%20Well%20Moratorium%20Area.pdf. 
110 Cf., e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2012) (prohibiting pollution that interferes with or 
otherwise impedes the operation of pollution control technologies at wastewater treatment 
plants). 
111 See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Region 3 Adm’r, EPA, to Michael Krancer, Acting 
Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 1 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/region3/ 
marcellus_shale/PADEP_Marcellus_Shale_030711.pdf (expressing concerns about 
inadequate treatment of wastewater). 
112 See id. (stating that further investigations would be needed to determine the threat to 
water quality, if any); Letter from Michael L. Krancer, Acting Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., to Shawn M. Garvin, Region 3 Adm’r, EPA 1 (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/Shawn_Garvin_Letter-April_6_2011.pdf (suggesting that 
no water quality standards for plants that accepted treated wastes from shale gas wells had 
been violated); Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Region 3 Adm’r, EPA, to Michael Krancer, 
Acting Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 1 (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
region03/marcellus_shale/pdf/letter/krancer-letter5-12-11.pdf (expressing further concerns 
about the adequacy of wastewater treatment). 
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enough underground injection-control well capacity to accept drilling and 
fracturing wastes.113 As operators drilled thousands of new wells, producing 
large quantities of liquid wastes containing salts and low levels of radioactive 
substances, operators sent the wastes to wastewater treatment plants. After the 
New York Times published an alarmist account of this situation – suggesting 
that plants were releasing radioactive waters into rivers114 – the EPA took note, 
demanding that the State’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 
address the situation and asking operators for disposal information.115 The DEP 
insisted that it tested stream waters below wastewater treatment plant 
discharges and found no water quality violations,116 but the EPA continued 
investigating.117 The DEP eventually discouraged operators from sending 
wastes to treatment plants, thus causing most wastes to be sent to Ohio 
injection wells.118 
In each of these scenarios of interdependent harm, activity conducted at a 
different time or place, at a lower activity rate, or without reliance on a limited 
treatment technology, might have had simple, independent effects with 
predictably collective impacts. But due to unique circumstances, including the 
increased density of well sites in some regions, inadequate pollution control or 
prevention techniques, and new well locations, among other factors, even small 
increases in unconventional well development activity have caused 
environmental harm in some cases. It is not clear how common these types of 
events will be in unconventional oil and gas development going forward. 
Indeed, although some of these effects are foreseeable – for example, we know 
that drilling a disposal well close to an aquifer might be risky – others might be 
impossible to predict. Policymakers must seriously consider the potential for 
interdependent effects from the growth of oil and gas development, and must 
address this risk ex ante. If policymakers know that certain pollutants will 
interact, for example, they should limit the concentration of activities that 
generate these pollutants; if they are aware that certain activities will pose 
higher risks near sensitive areas, they should limit the location of these 
activities. In cases where the effects cannot be known in advance, agencies 
 
113 See McCurdy, supra note 35, at 23 (describing the “[l]ack of [s]uitable [d]isposal 
[i]nfrastructure” in Pennsylvania). 
114 Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2011, at A2, available at http://www nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas html (“The 
documents reveal that the wastewater, which is sometimes hauled to sewage plants not 
designed to treat it and then discharged into rivers that supply drinking water, contains 
radioactivity at levels higher than previously known, and far higher than the level that 
federal regulators say is safe for these treatment plants to handle.”). 
115 Letter from Shawn M. Garvin to Michael Krancer, supra note 111, at 2. 
116 Letter from Michael L. Krancer to Shawn M. Garvin, supra note 112, at 1. 
117 See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin to Michael Krancer, supra note 112, at 1 (again 
expressing concerns about “the disposal of Marcellus Shale wastewater”).  
118 See McCurdy, supra note 35, at 23 (indicating that produced water waste was trucked 
to Ohio and West Virginia). 
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must, at minimum, prepare to respond nimbly when effects are discovered, as 
discussed in Part II. 
3. Uneven Impacts 
In a third diseconomy of scale, either the independent or interdependent 
harms of an activity may concentrate in certain areas, thus causing uneven 
distributions of impacts – harms that that were unaddressed in the initial 
regulatory balance. This is similar to certain interdependent harms, in which 
well density and location matter, but the relevant question in this case is the 
proximity of the activity to humans rather than to a sensitive environment or 
unstable area. In the oil and gas context, homeowners have complained that 
well development on neighboring properties contaminated their property and 
harmed their health.119 While their neighbors accumulate wealth from the oil 
and gas lease, these individuals allege that they suffer the harms of the 
development lease without compensation.120 
Oil and gas development and associated activities also can 
disproportionately affect people who live in areas where development 
materials are mined or oil and gas wastes are disposed of. Fracturing 
companies require large quantities of sand, which they inject down the well to 
prop open fractures in shale formations, and communities in states like 
Wisconsin have experienced rapid growth in sand mining and associated water 
and air pollution.121 And at the waste disposal stage, operators in Pennsylvania 
that could not send liquid oil and gas wastes to wastewater treatment plants 
shipped the waste to Ohio,122 causing more truck traffic,123 road damage, and 
congestion on certain routes.124 
Expanding oil and gas development also affects certain communities more 
than others because of economic factors. Drilling rigs in areas with abundant 
gas will quickly move to oil-rich regions if the price of gas drops below a 
 
119 See, e.g., Complaint at Law & in Equity at 9, Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 1981) (stating that plaintiffs and their minor 
children, who lived near a drilled and fractured well in Pennsylvania, complained that 
“[p]ollutants and industrial and/or residual waste, including ‘fracking fluid,’ was [sic] 
caused to be discharged into the ground or into the waters near Plaintiffs’ homes and into 
ground water wells”). 
120 See id. (alleging harm to plaintiffs and their properties). 
121 See WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., SILICA SAND MINING IN WISCONSIN 1 (2012), 
available at http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/documents/SilicaSandMiningFinal.pdf (“Sand 
mining has occurred in Wisconsin for hundreds of years; however, recently there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of mining proposals. This increase is attributed to a surge in 
hydrofracking . . . .”).  
122 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
123 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 
S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. 2011) (describing unrebutted evidence of “large trucks used to haul 
waste water” to underground injection control wells). 
124 See id. 
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certain threshold, leaving communities to suffer rapid boom and bust cycles.125 
In some cases, communities build thousands of new housing units and provide 
new infrastructure for rapidly growing populations of workers only to be stuck 
with expensive, abandoned structures as workers leave.126 
The social sciences and environmental justice literatures have explored these 
types of problems in depth,127 and these scholarly discussions are very relevant 
to regulatory diseconomies of scale. Many diseconomies will have independent 
and interdependent effects that fall within the boundaries of one jurisdiction – 
leading scholars like Professor David Spence to propose, in the oil and gas 
context, that governance of these impacts should primarily occur at the local or 
state level to capture these externalities more effectively.128 Even when harms 
remain within one governmental boundary, they might be addressed 
inadequately because policymakers, despite having full authority over the 
problem, fail to recognize (or purposefully ignore) changing scale as a trigger 
 
125 See, e.g., JEFFREY JACQUET, ENERGY BOOMTOWNS & NATURAL GAS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR MARCELLUS SHALE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS & RURAL COMMUNITIES 1-3 (2009), available 
at http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/publications/rdp/rdp43/view (surveying the boomtown 
literature and describing boom and bust cycles in the past). 
126 See, e.g., CITY OF WILLISTON, WILLISTON IMPACT STATEMENT 2012, at 5, 11, 13 
(2012), available at http://www.willistonnd.com/usrimages/Williston_Impact_Statement. 
pdf (showing a six-year projection of $625.4 million in infrastructural investments to 
support North Dakota’s booming shale oil industry, the addition of 1816 new housing units 
in 2012, and the addition of twelve new hotel properties since 2010). 
127 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF 
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 2 (1983) (exploring “the correlation between the location of 
hazardous waste landfills and the racial and economic status of surrounding communities”); 
Daniel A. Farber, The B.P. Blowout and the Social and Environmental Erosion of the 
Louisiana Coast, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 37, 38-39 (2012) (“Long before oil began to 
spew into the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, the Gulf had been paying the price for 
unchecked development, aggressive extraction of oil and natural gas, and an attitude of 
indifference to environmental consequences.”); Hari M. Osofsky et al., Environmental 
Justice and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 115 (2012) 
(concluding that, because oil and gas exploration and production wastes are exempt from 
federal hazardous waste disposal regulation, “the oil-soaked containment booms, oil-
contaminated debris, oil-contaminated soils, tar balls, tar patties, and oil-contaminated 
vegetative debris from the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill were disposed of in Subtitle D 
municipal solid waste landfills in Gulf Coast communities”); Robert B. Wiygul & Sharon 
Carr Harrington, Part One: RCRA, Communities, and Environmental Justice, 96 W. VA. L. 
REV. 405, 416 (1993-1994) (explaining that these protests – which largely sparked the 
environmental justice movement – occurred in a rural community); see also COMM’N FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (1987), available at http://www.ucc.org/about-us/archives/pdfs/toxwrace87.pdf 
(describing civil disobedience in opposition to a proposed polychlorinated biphenyl disposal 
facility in a poor, black North Carolina county in 1982).  
128 Spence, supra note 56, at 508. 
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for needed regulatory change. In some cases of unevenly distributed harms, 
however, effects may spill beyond existing jurisdictional boundaries; these can 
cause regulatory-commons type problems described by William Buzbee.129 In 
a regulatory commons, many government actors have control over one piece of 
a large problem – one that often occurs within several different jurisdictional 
territories – but none have full control over or the incentive to fix the entire 
problem.130 This leads to major gaps in authority and requires coordination of 
actors, and sometimes reallocation of governmental authority, to fix the 
problem.131 
4. Inadequate Regulatory Response 
The disproportionate harms (as compared to regulatory costs) that appear to 
accompany growing oil and gas development are exacerbated by certain 
governments’ failures – or refusals – to acknowledge the potential effects or 
address them. In Oklahoma, which has changed few of its substantive controls 
on drilling and fracturing despite expanding shale gas development,132 this 
problem is apparent. In response to concerns that growing gas development 
might cause groundwater contamination, the Oil and Gas Commission 
defended existing policies rather than innovating: 
While there have been incidents of groundwater contamination associated 
with oil and gas drilling and production operations in the State of 
Oklahoma, none of the documented incidents have been associated with 
hydraulic fracturing. Our agency has been regulating oil and gas drilling 
and production operations in the state for over 90 years.133 
With the acknowledgment that familiar processes of oil and gas production 
sometimes cause groundwater contamination – and that fracturing speeds up 
these familiar processes by allowing more wells to be drilled – one might have 
 
129 See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).  
130 See id. at 8-14, 23, 31 (describing how aquaculture, urban sprawl, and global warming 
provide examples of regulatory commons problems, and the limited authority and other 
disincentives that cause governments to inadequately address these issues). 
131 Id. at 56-57 (concluding that, when diverse actors cause cumulatively large harms, 
often throughout several jurisdictions, “[u]tilizing both more central or large units of 
government and small governmental units will be necessary, with different tasks allocated to 
each”). 
132 But see STRONGER, OKLAHOMA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%20Report%20of%20OK%20HF 
%20Review%201-19-2011.pdf (explaining that Oklahoma will include a review of 
hydraulic fracturing regulation in its broader, five-year strategic review of its oil and gas 
regulatory program).  
133 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at app. 15 (including the 
statement of Lori Wrotenbery, Director of the Oil and Gas Conservation Division, 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission). 
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expected the following response: “Because changes to a technology called 
fracturing have enabled the development of more oil and gas wells in the state, 
the Commission will ensure that increased rates of drilling do not cause 
continued groundwater contamination that has occurred in the past in 
association with drilling.” No such assurances, however, were forthcoming. 
The Railroad Commission of Texas, which regulates oil and gas extraction 
in Texas, has also, for the most part, ignored the fact that the simple expansion 
of traditional well development practices could cause new or larger problems. 
The Commission explains that “it has been regulating the oil and gas industry 
for more than 90 years” and “has in place a successful regulatory framework to 
ensure that all oil and gas activities, including hydraulic fracturing, do not 
impact groundwater or surface water.”134 Texas, like Oklahoma, has changed 
few of its oil and gas regulations135 as the number of hydraulically fractured 
shale gas wells has boomed.136 
Other states, facing likely booms in the near future, have come closer to 
recognizing and responding to the problem, but have failed to fully recognize 
the issue as one that involves scale. The Secretary of West Virginia’s 
Department of Environmental Protection, describing impending development 
of many shale gas wells in the state, observed: 
Quite frankly, our regulatory structure is not prepared to deal with [large 
numbers of new unconventional wells] . . . . All of a sudden we have, 
basically, a brand new industry that shows up on the scene. We see a lot 
of things, that quite frankly, the state was not prepared for.137 
This statement looks to the wrong problem because it inaccurately suggests 
that gas drilling is new to West Virginia; some stages of the fracturing process 
are new, but, as in other states, gas drilling has long occurred in the state.138 As 
 
134 Hydraulic Fracturing Frequently Asked Questions, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http:// 
www rrc.state.tx.us/about/faqs/hydraulicfracturing.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).  
135 But see R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., EAGLE FORD SHALE TASK FORCE REPORT (2013), 
available at http://www rrc.state.tx.us/commissioners/porter/reports/Eagle_Ford_Task_ 
Force_Report-0313.pdf (suggesting possible changes to regulation or oil development 
practices); Hannah Wiseman, The Private Role in Public Fracturing Disclosure and 
Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 54-55 (2013), http://www hblr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Wiseman_The-Private-Role-in-Public-Fracturing-Disclosure-and-
Regulation.pdf (describing Texas’s disclosure rule for chemicals, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 
3.29(c)(2)(A)(ix)-(xi) (2012), which is relatively stringent in terms of allowing appeal of 
trade secret status claims by operators).  
136 See Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Drilling Permits Issued, supra note 6 (“Increasing 
water use due to growing population, drought, and Barnett Shale development has 
heightened concerns about water availability in North Central Texas.”). 
137 Mike Soraghan, Oil and Gas: Protecting Oil from Water – the History of State 
Regulation, GREENWIRE (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.eenews net/public/Greenwire/2011/12/ 
14/1. 
138 See, e.g., Office of Oil and Gas, W.V. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.wv. 
gov/oil-and-gas/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (stating that the state’s oil 
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described in the solutions outlined in Part II, other states have directly 
recognized the scaling problem in the oil and gas context and have begun to 
address it, which suggests that the challenge is not an insurmountable one. 
These positive responses provide models for addressing diseconomies in other 
contexts. 
B. Other Diseconomies 
Oil and gas is not the only field that experiences scaling problems; they also 
arise under portions of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. These examples 
from environmental law show the types of diseconomies that could plague a 
number of other regulated activities in which actors can cause disproportionate 
harms as activity expands. 
1. Mobile Source Pollution Under the Clean Air Act 
The mobile source portion of the federal Clean Air Act, like oil and gas 
regulation at the state level, focuses on individual sources; it largely ignores 
the fact that the number of these sources rapidly increases as our population 
grows, and that pollution from these sources rises as we drive more miles.139 
Indeed, many regions of the United States violate federal air quality 
requirements due to their inability under the Act140 to adequately control 
emissions from fast-increasing numbers of mobile sources.141 
A simplified hypothetical example, using fuel content and emissions 
controls as constants, demonstrates the familiar problem of controlling 
individual sources that have relatively benign effects at a small scale but larger 
ones as source numbers increase.142 When combusted in a vehicle, assume that 
 
and gas agency “maintains records on over 55,000 active and 12,000 inactive oil & gas 
wells”). 
139 Andrew P. Morriss, The Next Generation of Mobile Source Regulation, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 325, 327 (2008) (observing that “there are more Americans driving, and 
Americans are driving more, every year” and that in the commercial sector, as a result of 
adding more trucks to the road, increasing total miles driven, and increasing miles driven 
per truck, “[b]etween 1980 and 2004, the number of gallons of fuel burned by commercial 
trucks went from 19.96 million gallons to 33.968 million gallons”). 
140 42 U.S.C. § 7512a (2006) (requiring that, in certain areas with bad air quality, 
requiring states to revise their plans for implementing the Clean Air Act to “contain a 
forecast of vehicle miles traveled” and “provide for the implementation of specific measures 
to be undertaken” if vehicle miles traveled will exceed those forecasted or if the area fails to 
attain national standards for quantities of carbon monoxide in the ambient air).  
141 See Wilcox, supra note 37, at 4, 20 (indicating that automobiles are “the predominant 
source of transported ozone in many nonattainment areas,” and that, “[d]espite technological 
advances in pollution control, primarily through measures that reduce emissions from 
automobiles, increases in population and in per capita consumption of energy have kept 
ambient ozone levels high”). 
142 This cumulative impacts problem shows the “independent” diseconomy of scale 
described here, in which expansions of activity with individual, independent risks that 
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a highly refined fuel with oxygenating additives emits one gram of pollutant 
per mile driven regardless of the vehicle burning it. Hypothetically, an 
emission control technology installed on each manufactured vehicle further 
reduces emissions per mile driven by 0.5 grams, causing each vehicle to emit 
0.5 grams of the pollutant per mile. When there are 100 vehicles on the road, 
total emissions per mile from the U.S. vehicle fleet are fifty grams of pollutant. 
When there are one million vehicles on the road, total emissions expand to 
50,000 grams per mile. While actual mobile source controls are much more 
complicated, this hypothetical scenario captures the core elements of the 
problem. Technologies and fuel content are relatively constant, and regulatory 
controls are occasionally ratcheted up for new model years.143 The number of 
cars and miles driven, on the other hand, varies widely and has remained on an 
upward trajectory.144 
As a result of this and other activity, the EPA recently predicted that despite 
numerous interstate rules on stationary sources of ground-level ozone and 
particulate matter, as well as tighter mobile source controls, “a number of areas 
would remain out of attainment” under current air quality standards; even with 
proposed tighter controls, the agency predicted that fourteen regions of the 
country would still be out of attainment in 2015.145 
This problem is not simply one involving collective pollution that causes 
greater harms than initially anticipated within regulation; there are 
interdependent effects as well. When it reaches certain critical levels, air 
pollution has more powerful effects in certain areas and can interact with other 
problems, thus magnifying harms as scale rises.146 Interdependent harms can 
 
accumulate can change how harms rise as compared to regulatory costs and can throw off 
initial baseline assumptions in regulation. For discussions of cumulative impact, see supra 
note 4 and accompanying text. 
143 See 40 C.F.R. § 600.001 (2013). 
144 See, e.g., NPTS: Vehicles (1995), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, RESEARCH & 
INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DL_SelectFields.asp?Table_ID=10 
41&DB_Short_Name=NPTS (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (select “Annmiles”; then 
“Download”) (showing more than forty-three billion miles, annualized, driven in 1995 by 
more than 75,000 U.S. drivers); NPTS: Vehicles (1990), BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, 
RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DL_SelectFields.asp? 
Table_ID=1035&DB_Short_Name=NPTS (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (select “Annmiles”; 
then “Download”) (showing more than seven billion miles, annualized, driven in 1990 by 
more than 40,000 U.S. drivers). 
145 Michael Bradley & John Bachman, Air Quality Mgmt. Subcomm., EPA, Challenges 
for Air Quality Management – A Look Ahead 1-2 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript; 
available at http://epa.gov/air/caaac/aqm/200608_challenges.pdf) (describing CAIR, which 
has since been replaced by the transport rule). 
146 See James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between 
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 922-
23 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he chemistry that creates high levels of ozone . . . involves 
non-linear interactions that produce surprising and counterintuitive results” and describing 
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arise, for example, from interactions between air pollutants emitted by cars and 
power plants. Nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons mix and, when heated by 
sunlight, form ground-level ozone,147 which can cause health problems; the 
more of these pollutants are emitted from cars and other sources, the more 
ozone is formed.148 
Many air pollutants disperse quickly, but others concentrate in certain areas, 
causing an uneven distribution of harm. As occurs in Southern California – an 
area chronically plagued with air pollution – a ring of mountains can trap 
pollution from cars and other sources.149 Some pollution, and particularly the 
nitrogen oxide released from cars, also travels long distances and, due to 
prevailing wind patterns, affects certain downstream states more than others;150 
this has fomented decades-long battles over interstate air pollution control.151 
2. Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the Clean Water Act 
As the U.S. population has grown, so, too have many sources of water 
pollution. The Clean Water Act strictly controls large, industrial pollution 
sources that pipe contaminants directly into surface waters.152 These sources 
must obtain a permit, and permitted actors must limit the amount of pollution 
they emit.153 These effluent limits have substantially improved water quality: 
many lakes and streams – once badly polluted – have become fishable and 
 
meteorological and other conditions that also influence air quality). 
147 Id. at 914 (“[T]ropospheric ozone – one of the first air pollutants for which EPA set 
air quality standards . . . forms in the atmosphere when emissions of nitrogen oxides and 
hydrocarbons (‘precursor pollutants’) react chemically in the presence of heat and 
sunlight.”); see also Owen, supra note 4, at 195 (explaining that emissions “interact in 
complex and nonlinear ways”). 
148 Fine & Owen, supra note 146, at 944-46 (examining ozone formation and the factors 
that contribute to formation, including emissions from cars). 
149 See, e.g., Air Quality, Region 9: Southern California, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/socal/ 
air (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (stating that large mountains border the Los Angeles Basin, 
and that “[f]requent sunny days and low rainfall contribute to ozone formation, as well as 
high levels of fine particles and dust”). 
150 See EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(discussing how “[s]ome emissions of air pollutants travel across State boundaries and affect 
air quality in downwind States,” and describing the Transport Rule for nitrogen oxides and 
sulfur dioxides). 
151 See id. at 37 (vacating the Transport Rule); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 901 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the predecessor to the Transport Rule). 
152 See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 298 (2009) 
(“The Act instructs EPA to establish various technology-based, increasingly stringent 
effluent limitations for categories of point sources.”). 
153 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b), (e) (2012) (requiring effluent limitations and that the limitations 
“be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollutants”). 
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swimmable.154 Yet many bodies of water still fail to meet water quality 
standards.155 
These persistent and sometimes expanding water quality problems are due 
in large part to the rise of thousands of nonindustrial activities that collectively 
emit massive amounts of water pollution. Farms, golf courses, and lawns send 
fertilizers into surface waters, causing algae and plants to grow and decay and 
pull oxygen out of the water.156 These “nonpoint” sources of pollution, which 
generate harmful runoff in the form of soil, pesticides, and other chemicals,157 
have increased in quantity as our population and lifestyles have changed. In 
2000, states identified agricultural nonpoint source pollution as “the leading 
source of water quality impacts on surveyed rivers and lakes.”158 The Clean 
Water Act initially did not address this major pollution source in balancing 
regulatory costs against harms, and although it has since been amended to 
partially address the problem,159 the Act – and its regulations – largely have 
failed. 
In the case of nonpoint source pollution, many sources simply are not 
regulated, rather than regulated at a level that now fails to adequately balance 
regulatory costs against the harms of a growing activity.160 In areas with severe 
water quality problems, for which states must establish the total amount of a 
pollutant that can be emitted into waters daily, agencies have established some 
controls.161 But states frequently are hesitant to regulate individual activities162 
 
154 See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today – Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 591 (2004) (describing progress and pointing to major 
pollution reductions for wastewater treatment plants and industrial sources). 
155 See EPA, supra note 38, at 9 (reporting, for example, that forty-four percent of U.S. 
rivers and streams are “impaired”). 
156 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 02-4130, EFFECTS OF LAWN FERTILIZER ON NUTRIENT 
CONCENTRATION IN RUNOFF FROM LAKESHORE LAWNS, LAUDERDALE LAKES, WISCONSIN 1, 6 
(2002), available at http://wi.water.usgs.gov/pubs/wrir-02-4130/wrir-02-4130.pdf; 
Eutrophication, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://toxics.usgs.gov/definitions/eutrophication. 
html (last updated May 23, 2013, 3:22 PM).  
157 Polluted Runoff: Nonpoint Source Pollution, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/ 
index.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).  
158 EPA, EPA 841-F-05-001, PROTECTING WATER QUALITY FROM AGRICULTURAL 
RUNOFF 1 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/NPS/Ag_Runoff_Fact_Sheet.pdf.  
159 Clean Water Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012)) (providing for the regulation of nonpoint sources in 
certain contexts). 
160 Congress knew early on that nonpoint sources posed a substantial threat but did not 
initially address them in the Clean Water Act. See ENVTL. POLICY DIV. OF THE COMM. ON 
PUB. WORKS, 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. DOC. NO. 93-1, at 793 (Comm. Print 1973) (“The Committee 
clearly recognizes that nonpoint sources of pollution are a major contributor to water quality 
problems.”). 
161 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (requiring states to identify waters in which effluent limitations 
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and have been slow to establish total maximum daily loads for problem 
waters.163 
As with oil and gas and air pollution, the effects of thousands of sources of 
water pollution are not simply independent and cumulative. Due to surface 
topography, nonpoint source pollution often flows to a single body of water, 
leading to concentrated pollution in one area. Pollution from farms throughout 
the Midwest has created the “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mississippi, an area 
with oxygen levels so low that the zone cannot support life.164 This has 
substantially affected the fishing industry that is vital to the economies of the 
Louisiana and Mississippi coasts.165 Similar pollution from Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, which runs into the Chesapeake Bay, is also 
the primary cause of fish die-offs and rising bacteria counts in that region.166 
One might argue that the list of diseconomies of scale is so long that the 
classification becomes useless – humans inevitably cause large harms, 
collective and otherwise, many of which cannot simply be solved by a single 
harm threshold, as harms often converge and have disproportionate impacts in 
certain regions. Yet as is commonly recognized in the environmental 
literature,167 many laws focus on individual actors – and typically large actors 
– rather than total harms (often caused by small actors) and the dynamism of 
these harms. The Clean Air Act, although it stringently regulates mobile 
 
are insufficient to “implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters”); 
Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the EPA to set Total 
Maximum Daily Loads for waters “polluted only by nonpoint sources of pollution”); see 
also Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 299 n.2 (2009) 
(noting that the Total Maximum Daily Load program “supplements the technology-based 
standards, serving to ‘prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels’ even when 
point sources comply with effluent limitations” (quoting EPA v. California ex rel. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976))). 
162 Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive 
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 75 (2003) (describing “the 
relative failure of state-driven nonpoint source pollution control programs”). 
163 J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Clean Water Act: Strategies for Fitting New 
Science into Old Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 1381, 1396 (2010) (explaining that states must establish 
total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) or face withdrawal of federal funds). 
164 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 60 (“Each spring, a massive slug of nutrients flows 
down the Mississippi River and empties into the Gulf of Mexico where it creates an 
enormous hypoxic ‘dead zone,’ an area so low in oxygen that aquatic life must either flee or 
suffocate.”).  
165 See NOAA: Gulf of Mexico ‘Dead Zone’ Predications Feature Uncertainty, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (June 20, 2012), http://www.noaanews noaa.gov/stories 
2012/20120621_deadzone html (indicating that the dead zone “threaten[s] valuable 
commercial and recreational Gulf fisheries”).  
166 Chesapeake Bay, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/gr8water/xbrochure/chesapea. 
html (last updated July 7, 2011) (explaining how many nutrients in the Chesapeake Bay 
originate from nonpoint sources in various states). 
167 See, e.g., infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.  
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sources, applies the most detailed and arguably heavy-handed regulations to 
new and modified large, industrial air pollution sources, and the Clean Water 
Act focuses even more closely on these big polluters.168 This is sensible, as 
initial regulation of the largest contributors to a given problem focuses on 
solutions that are likely to make the most and quickest progress for the least 
cost.169 But we have moved far beyond the low-hanging fruit in U.S. 
environmental regulation, and persistent problems remain. This is due in part 
to the challenge of adequately enforcing regulations for millions of small, 
individually less significant sources.170 But the problem of diseconomies is 
much larger and more complex, than the familiar scenario of fewer, larger 
actors causing big harms: it involves the failure of regulatory and institutional 
design to incorporate scaling factors into the initial balance of regulatory costs 
and harms, and of legislators and agencies to write rules that can change 
nimbly, sometimes automatically, in response to scale-based concerns. 
II. ADDRESSING DISECONOMIES: CHANGING LAWS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN 
Regulatory diseconomies of scale contribute to some of the most persistent 
environmental problems in the United States and, as discussed in Part I, have 
introduced new harms in the oil and gas context. In many cases, this failure is a 
direct result of the refusal of lawmakers and regulators to acknowledge that 
scale, rather than changing technology or a cataclysmic event, can have major 
effects. And even where scale-based change causes relatively cataclysmic 
events, responses are slow to emerge – in part because when an activity has 
long occurred, we tend to become familiar with these dramatic events and 
assume that they will remain somewhat rare.171 As a first step to addressing 
 
168 See Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1437 n.134 (2005) (“The major permitting 
programs under both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act apply to large industrial 
facilities.”). 
169 See Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1393-94, 1419 (explaining that “it is often 
more efficient to focus on the most significant contributors to a problem” and that “a focus 
on high-percentage factors often concentrates effort and resources on the sources that may 
make the most difference at the least expense,” but emphasizing the need to consider 
aggregate effects). 
170 See Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 264 (“We have already picked much of this low-
hanging fruit, regulating the most visible pollutants and sources first. Thus far, however, 
conventional regulation has been less successful at controlling emissions from small mobile 
sources, such as automobiles, or diffuse sources, such farms, which are much more difficult 
to monitor.”). 
171 Certain states’ reactions to triggered seismicity or induced seismicity – earthquakes 
caused by human activity, including oil and gas underground injection control wells –
exemplify this tendency to wait to address problems, or to assume that the problems will 
remain rare. In Oklahoma, for example, several reports indicate that underground injection 
control wells have caused some earthquakes. Although the state’s Geological Survey has 
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this problem, agencies must identify areas in which diseconomies likely will 
emerge (or already have emerged). Then, legislatures and agencies must 
substantively address these problems ex ante, or, as a second-best solution, as 
rapidly as possible after they arise. 
Not all regulatory diseconomies can be addressed or even anticipated before 
they occur,172 and scholars like Thomas Merrill and David Schizer have 
accordingly argued in the oil and gas context that we should rely in part on ex 
post tort law to address the unknown harms of fracturing.173 Indeed, David 
Dana and I observe in another article that many of the specific risks of 
unconventional oil and gas development cannot be fully addressed through ex 
ante command and control regulation and that insurance and bonding regimes 
are needed.174 But where we can predict volumetric expansions of regulated 
activities and their impacts, ex ante approaches will often be far superior to 
haphazard ex post responses. And agencies and legislators can act without 
fully knowing the risks simply by setting harm thresholds – limiting the total 
 
actively investigated these incidents, it is taking a very cautious approach to suggesting any 
regulatory changes. See, e.g., AUSTIN HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EXAMINATION 
OF POSSIBLY INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA FIELD, 
GARVIN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA 18 (2011), available at http://www.ogs.ou.edu/pubsscanned/ 
openfile/OF1_2011.pdf (observing proven incidents of triggered seismicity); Katie M. 
Keranen et al., Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between 
Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, GEOLOGY (2013), http:// 
geology.gsapubs.org/content/early/2013/03/26/G34045.1 full.pdf (describing how UIC 
wells likely caused earthquakes in Oklahoma); Position Statement on Triggered or Induced 
Seismicity, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY http://www.ogs.ou.edu/earthquakes/OGSPosition 
InducedSeismicity.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2013) (“It is true that the past few years have 
seen a significant increase in earthquake activity within Oklahoma. While we are studying 
the possibility that some of this activity could be related to oil and gas operations, it is 
unlikely that all of the earthquakes can be attributed to human activities.”). Unlike 
Oklahoma, which has not changed its state-administered federal permitting of oil and gas 
UIC wells, Arkansas has placed certain areas off limits for UIC wells in response to 
earthquakes, and Ohio has changed its regulations. See supra notes 108-09 and 
accompanying text. 
172 Cf. supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the inability to quantify certain 
risks of shale gas development). 
173 Merrill & Schizer, supra note 6, at 191 (“In many cases, the evidence will not reveal 
exactly how the water was contaminated, and thus whether a best practices regulation 
addressed the relevant conduct in the case. In these circumstances, we would rely on 
rebuttable presumptions of causation. Specifically, if the plaintiff proves both (1) that 
fracturing caused the contamination and (2) that the energy company violated a best 
practices regulation governing a particular pathway of contamination, we would create a 
presumption that this was the pathway of contamination.”). 
174 See David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the 
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 24-25), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353061. 
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amount of water that may be withdrawn from a stream175 or the total amount of 
pollutant permitted in air or water in a given region, for example. Certainly, if 
and when we reach any future, legislatively imposed harm thresholds, politics, 
science, and attitudes will have changed. But laws that protect the general 
public against the externalities of a growing industry sometimes will be easier 
to remove or modify than to enact.176 If we respond to diseconomies ex post 
rather than anticipating them ex ante, irreversible harms could emerge during 
the inevitable regulatory lag between the occurrence of scale-based harms and 
regulation of the activity causing them. This is particularly true in the oil and 
gas context, where operators move rapidly in and out of regions: Drilling and 
fracturing can be completed within a time span of months,177 at which point 
harm from this activity might already have occurred if not addressed ex ante. 
Furthermore, if a growing activity does not end up leading us closer to a 
harm threshold – for example, due to voluntarily adopted pollution treatment 
technologies and innovation as the industry grows – then industry would not 
suffer the burdens of heightened regulation. More stringent individual controls 
simply would not be triggered. 
Even for scale-based harms that we cannot predict, general, ex ante laws 
that at least incorporate scaling concepts and require periodic review to 
identify whether scaling concerns have emerged are essential. Legislation that 
requires agencies to monitor the growth of regulated activities and measure 
their harms could allow for the earlier identification of potentially dangerous 
harm thresholds, and for a more rapid response. 
Finally, from a political economy perspective, ex ante regulation that 
addresses the possibility of harms expanding along with the growth of an 
activity – and the need to constrain the quantity, location, and density of these 
harms – might be one of the only realistic means of curbing diseconomies of 
scale.178 As the industry grows from an initial baseline of relatively low levels 
of activity, it might develop so many revolving-door relationships with 
regulators, and acquire so many effective lobbying resources, that efforts to 
modify regulation meaningfully, while avoiding inefficient capture, could 
become slim. 
The scale-based regulations proposed in the following Section would not 
dictate a particular response – indeed, agencies could potentially ignore harm 
thresholds if they felt that politics, science, or public opinion so dictated. But 
 
175 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
176 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 47, at 1049 (“Given that many environmental, health, and 
safety hazards only become known after a product or activity is already well established 
within society, individuals may perceive the ‘new risk’ to be the regulatory prospect of 
banning or taxing the product or activity, rather than the hazard created by the product or 
activity itself.”). But see Merrill & Schizer, supra note 6, at 159-60 (arguing that draconian 
environmental laws passed in response to dramatic events, some of which may be too heavy 
handed, are hard to remove). 
177 Dana & Wiseman, supra note 174 (manuscript at 11-14).  
178 I am grateful to Robert Mikos for this observation.  
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these regulations would provide a much needed foundation from which 
agencies could build. 
A. Review of Regulated Activities to Identify Scale-Based Problems 
Before agencies or legislatures can substantively address scale-based harms, 
they must first identify them. Yet these entities only sporadically or partly 
recognize scaling problems, thus leading to regulatory lag or a failure to 
regulate at all. This is understandable. Once a government entity has 
established a baseline regulation for a particular activity and has carefully 
balanced the harms and regulatory costs – or has chosen not to regulate in light 
of assumed harms – a sense of complacency emerges: the activity now 
operates within a set of rules (or regulators assume does not need fixing), and 
officials can move to the next problem. These “agency ruts” occur not only due 
to agency stasis, but also, possibly, as a result of declining public pressure. As 
Lynn Blais and Wendy Wagner have observed, “[o]nce a pollution-control 
standard is in place, public attention to the issue may focus elsewhere.”179 
Two requirements might prevent stasis from the outset and push 
policymakers and agencies to implement the substantive remedies to scaling 
problems proposed in the proceeding discussion.180 Environmental review 
provisions, which require agencies to consider the impacts of their proposed 
actions, can expressly mandate considerations of scale-based harms.181 
Similarly, sunset provisions tied to the volume of regulated activity can force 
reconsideration of the adequacy of old regulations, particularly as an activity 
grows. These, too, can push agencies to identify the rise of a scale-based 
problem. 
In many cases, policymakers and agency actors lack the information 
necessary to determine whether a diseconomy of scale will occur, and if so, 
which type. Where we cannot predict diseconomies ex ante, periodic reviews 
also will be important in order to identify recently-emerged diseconomies and 
to force agencies out of their rut.182 This review may lead agencies to more 
quickly respond to harms that otherwise might have festered for years. 
Environmental and sunset reviews, which could identify both likely future 
diseconomies and those that have emerged recently, will require certain data in 
order to be effective; information-forcing regulatory mechanisms therefore will 
be essential to these reviews. Regulated actors must produce information about 
 
179 Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1713-14 (2008). 
180 See infra Part II.B-D. 
181 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 4, at 196 (suggesting that setting thresholds “compels” 
planners “to think through the implications of setting regulatory thresholds at a particular 
level”). 
182 See, e.g., Blais & Wagner, supra note 179, at 1714 (“[R]ational resource allocation 
concerns will counsel in favor of pursuing initial rulemakings rather than regular revisions, 
and technology- and science-based standards will get stuck in ‘rulemaking ruts.’”). 
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the various harms their activities cause, particularly as these activities expand. 
And although this Article focuses on the need to identify and address harms 
that grow disproportionately, environmental and sunset reviews would also call 
attention to regulatory economies of scale – circumstances where the growth of 
a regulated activity caused harms to disproportionately decline and where less 
(or no) regulation would be needed.  
1. Environmental Review Tailored to Scale-Based Concerns 
Environmental review is a key provision needed to force agencies to identify 
potential diseconomies of scale. Ideally, this review would occur before a 
scale-based problem emerges, although ex post review is important as a 
second-best strategy. In the context of “massive” problems like climate 
change, Professors J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman call this forward thinking 
review-based approach a “predecision assessment strategy” of “directly 
incorporating the concept of cumulative effects into an agency’s 
decisionmaking architecture.”183 They suggest that the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) makes the most progress toward this goal by requiring 
consideration of cumulative effects.184 Lynn Blais and Wendy Wagner 
similarly recommend a “contemporaneous revision-planning regime,” in which 
“agencies would evaluate during the original rulemaking process the degree to 
which technological innovation is likely to advance in the relevant field in the 
future,” thus allowing more stringent standards for technology-based emission 
controls.185 In the context of diseconomies of scale, ex ante considerations of 
cumulative effects and likely technological innovation are not enough: 
interdependent and unevenly distributed effects are equally important and 
should be incorporated into ex ante review. Environmental review statutes can, 
and sometimes do, require consideration of these factors, and states should 
more consistently require these types of reviews in order to identify potential 
regulatory diseconomies. 
NEPA and similar state-level environmental review statutes already require 
government actors to review certain activities, including regulation, to 
determine whether they will have significant environmental impacts, and if so, 
to consider alternatives.186 These acts are purely procedural and require no 
substantive response, but they force agencies approving permits or writing new 
rules to think about the environmental and social effects caused by agency 
approval of projects. And in some cases, the agencies administering review 
statutes have recognized their value in the context of regulatory diseconomies, 
although not labeling them as such. The Council on Environmental Quality 
 
183 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 95. 
184 Id. at 96 (describing NEPA as “the environmental statute that has produced the most 
developed body of cumulative effects law”). 
185 Blais & Wagner, supra note 179, at 1731 (emphasis added). 
186 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). 
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(CEQ), which guides agencies conducting federal reviews under NEPA, 
observes: 
Evidence is increasing that the most devastating environmental effects 
may result not from the direct effects of a particular action, but from the 
combination of individually minor effects of multiple actions over 
time.187 
CEQ regulations define cumulative effects as including environmental 
harms that “result[] from the incremental impact of the action when added to 
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”188 At minimum, 
this addresses concerns about the total harms of a growing activity. 
Despite its progress in requiring agencies to consider total harms, NEPA has 
been criticized189 as requiring inadequate consideration of cumulative effects: 
for example, one agency approval of one oil and gas lease on federal lands may 
ignore thousands of other wells.190 And although NEPA requires some 
consideration of noncumulative harms – including an environmental justice 
component, for example – it does not directly require full consideration of the 
collective, interdependent, and unevenly distributed effects of a growing 
activity. 
New York’s approach to environmental review seems to have avoided this 
scale blindness, at least in the context of oil and gas. The New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulates mineral 
development, and when it received numerous requests to drill and fracture new 
gas wells in New York, it refused to permit them immediately. Although the 
DEC already had conducted an environmental review of its oil and gas 
program in 1992,191 it decided that the drilling and fracturing activities recently 
proposed were different and required further consideration.192 The more than 
1000-page document that resulted from these efforts – along with additional 
 
187 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1 (1997), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/ 
files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/G-CEQ-ConsidCumulEffects.pdf.  
188 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
189 See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role of NEPA in Fossil Fuel Resource 
Development and Use in the Western United States, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 311-
15 (exploring the boundaries of NEPA cumulative effects analysis, and observing that 
“[c]ontemplation of action, without more, is not enough to mandate the drafting of an EIS”).  
190 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 513 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that two gas projects, for which notice of intent to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA had been sufficient, “did not establish 
reasonable foreseeability of the incremental impact of those projects” and thus did not have 
to be considered when the Bureau of Land Management reviewed a third, nearby project). 
191 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM, at 
FGEIS1 (1992). 
192 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 1-3 to 1-4.  
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health studies – described potential threshold effects in sensitive environments, 
including in upstate New York, which supplies New York City with drinking 
water.193 It also explored potential impacts of drilling and fracturing in already 
polluted areas and disproportionate effects, both positive and negative, on 
certain communities within the state.194 
Although New York has not yet allowed the development of hydraulically 
fractured wells without individualized review,195 its proposed regulations 
appear to take into account the many scale-based considerations in the DEC’s 
environmental review. For example, the DEC has proposed to prohibit drilling 
and fracturing in the watershed that contains New York City’s drinking water 
supply.196 In an earlier proposal, Governor Andrew Cuomo also suggested that 
only those communities facing severe budget constraints could allow hydraulic 
fracturing, thus disproportionately benefiting these communities without 
subjecting broader portions of the state to the potential environmental harms of 
this activity.197 
Just as New York’s environmental review law requires the agency or state 
policymakers to certain scale-type considerations into account,198 legislatures 
could more fully and consistently mandate this more inclusive review. When 
large numbers of new polluting activities were proposed, state rules could 
require more careful agency consideration of the likely harms of this pollution, 
and mandate that these agencies craft regulations to address them ex ante. 
 
193 Revised Proposed Express Terms 6 NYCRR Parts 750.1 and 750.3, N.Y. STATE DEP’T 
OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec ny.gov/regulations/87445 html (last visited Oct. 
27, 2013) (proposing to prohibit fracturing within, or within 4000 feet of, New York City’s 
unfiltered water supply watersheds). 
194 N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 6-317 (describing 
likely changes in community character and other social impacts). 
195 New Recommendations Issued in Hydraulic Fracturing Review, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERVATION (June 30, 2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/75403 html (stating 
that “[t]here is no administrative or discretionary moratorium on high-volume fracturing” 
but that the agency may determine that fracturing is unsafe and thus will not implement the 
regulations allowing but constraining the impacts of fracturing). 
196 See Revised Proposed Express Terms 6 NYCRR Parts 750.1 and 750.3, supra note 
193. 
197 Danny Hakim, Cuomo Proposal Would Restrict Gas Drilling to a Struggling Region, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/ny 
region/hydrofracking-under-cuomo-plan-would-be-restricted-to-a-few-counties html 
(describing Governor Cuomo’s “plan to limit the controversial drilling method known as 
hydraulic fracturing to portions of several struggling New York counties along the border 
with Pennsylvania, and to permit it only in communities that express support for the 
technology” – a plan that was not carried out). 
198 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 617.7 (Consol. 2011) (directing a state actor, when 
evaluating whether an action is significant, to consider, among other factors, “two or more 
related actions undertaken, funded or approved by an agency, none of which has or would 
have a significant impact on the environment, but when considered cumulatively would 
meet one or more of the criteria in this subdivision”). 
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2. Sunset Provisions 
Sunset provisions tied to the volume of regulated activity, like 
environmental review prior to agency action, can cause agencies to catch and 
address diseconomies before they emerge, or, as a second-best solution, to 
respond to them more quickly. Certain state provisions already require 
agencies to periodically review the adequacy of regulation and institutional 
capacity (and the need for the institution) through this type of review,199 and 
these provisions typically are triggered by the length of time for which the 
agency has operated.200 This fails to address scale directly but is a decent 
proxy, as some regulated activities are likely to have grown between review 
periods. 
In Texas, the state legislature reviews institutional capacity – but not the 
adequacy of regulations – through periodic sunset self-reviews prepared by 
agencies, including the state’s oil and gas agency, the Railroad Commission of 
Texas.201 Within the review, the agency reports the number of regulated 
facilities, including, for example, pipelines and wells, the number of inspectors 
available to investigate these facilities, and the number of inspections actually 
conducted.202 The Commission also describes the other agencies with 
jurisdiction over certain aspects of the activity that it regulates. It explains, for 
example, that a state health department regulates the handling and transfer of 
naturally occurring radioactive materials from oil and gas wells, whereas the 
oil and gas agency regulates their disposal.203 This type of analysis can identify 
the need for jurisdictional changes if environmental harms from the regulated 
activity expand. For example, a state might decide to transfer authority over 
portions of the activity to a better-funded or more powerful agency, to 
centralize control within one agency, or to devolve authority to municipalities 
that might experience disproportionately large or small impacts of a growing 
activity, allowing the municipalities to enact more or fewer regulations as 
needed. 
 
199 See, e.g., Sunset Advisory Comm’n, STATE OF TEX., http://www.sunset.state.tx.us (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2013) (“The [Sunset Advisory] Commission is a legislative body that 
reviews the policies and programs of more than 150 government agencies every 12 years.”). 
Timing legislation, which simply ends the application of certain laws within a particular 
time period, is now more common than sunset review. See Gersen, supra note 47, at 247 
(describing “temporary legislation – statutes containing clauses limiting the duration of their 
own validity”). This Article does not advocate for the use of timing legislation. 
200 See Gersen, supra note 47, at 247.  
201 Id. 
202 See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT 79, 97 (2009), available at 
http://www rrc.state.tx.us/about/divisions/RRCSelfEvaluationReport2009.pdf (describing 
44,000 liquefied natural gas and similar facilities, ten inspectors assigned to these facilities, 
and more than 12,500 inspections conducted annually; and describing the 125 inspectors 
assigned to land-based oil and gas wells). 
203 Id. at 13.  
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3. Information-Forcing Regulations 
To locate and predict growing activities and their harms within 
environmental or sunset reviews, agencies need specific information on the 
effects of the activities they regulate, and how harms change as these activities 
grow. Legislatures and agencies thus should develop information-forcing 
mechanisms that reveal the extent of the harm of a growing activity – requiring 
actors to report the location of their activity, total quantities of wastes produced 
and resources used, and any pollution events that occur, for example. 
Although most state and federal actors have not directly recognized the 
regulatory diseconomies problem, many have begun to require regulated 
industries to produce this type of information; these examples serve as limited 
models for the specific types of data that should be consistently produced in 
order to identify diseconomies of scale. The federal Clean Air and Clean Water 
Acts require certain polluters to monitor their emissions and report them,204 for 
example, but this extensive data collection only occurs for large, centralized 
sources of pollution – typically ignoring individual emissions from mobile 
sources of air pollution205 and nonpoint water pollution sources with large 
collective and interdependent harms.206 As Daniel Esty and Marian Chertow 
have observed, advances in technology allow us to monitor nearly all 
emissions, including emissions from small sources.207 Requiring measurement 
and reporting from these sources will be essential if we are to fully understand 
diseconomies of scale, where they occur, and the areas in which they may 
cause threshold or uneven effects.208 
 
204 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a) (2006) (requiring sources of sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions subject to acid rain trading program requirements to conduct 
continuous emissions monitoring). 
205 But see 40 C.F.R. § 86.010-.018 (2013) (requiring certain emission control systems 
on trucks to be monitored for malfunctions); Air Emissions Reporting Requirements, 40 
C.F.R. § 51.15(b) (requiring states with nonattainment areas to conduct emission inventories 
for all sources, including on-road and nonroad mobile sources). 
206 But see L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
710, 710-11 (2013) (referring to “downstream monitoring stations” that measure the 
collective runoff from certain cities required to limit their stormwater runoff).  
207 Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in 
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1, 5 
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1998).  
208 There is a broad literature exploring the power of data monitoring to improve 
environmental performance in contexts far beyond scale and the current dearth of adequate 
information in environmental regulation. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 267-68 
(arguing that “risk-based regulation has been abandoned in a number of statutes” because of 
the lack of adequate data that supports risk-based analysis that would establish, for example 
“‘safe’ (or acceptable) threshold levels of human exposures or environmental 
concentrations,” and calling for better information production). See generally Wendy E. 
Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed 
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619 (2004) (describing the lack 
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In the oil and gas context, states have begun to require this type of reporting 
from small sources that could collectively cause a variety of harms. In states 
like Pennsylvania,209 Colorado,210 and West Virginia,211 each operator – at 
each of the thousands of oil and gas sites in the state – must submit a waste 
disposal or waste reduction plan indicating the quantity of waste likely 
produced at each well and how the operator plans to handle it. Texas requires 
reporting of the volumes of water used to fracture each well.212 And throughout 
the country, operators have also begun to voluntarily report the chemicals and 
quantity of water used for hydraulic fracturing at each well site, although not 
all operators have chosen to participate.213 States also increasingly require 
chemical disclosure,214 and others mandate baseline testing of groundwater 
near wells to identify the contaminants already in the water prior to oil and gas 
operations.215 These types of information collection should be required more 
consistently to illuminate specific mechanisms underlying diseconomies of 
scale and to support improved substantive responses. 
 
of scientific data necessary to support better regulation). 
209 25 PA. CODE § 95.10(b) (2010) (requiring site operators to develop wastewater source 
reduction strategies in accordance with other provisions in the regulation).  
210 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:216(c)(5) (2009) (requiring “[a] plan for the 
management of exploration and production waste”).  
211 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-7 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013) (requiring a 
description of “planned management and disposition of wastewater after completion from 
fracturing, refracturing, stimulation and production activities”).  
212 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2)(A)(viii) (West 2012) (mandating disclosure of 
“the total volume of water used in the hydraulic fracturing treatment(s) of the well or the 
type and total volume of the base fluid used in the hydraulic fracturing treatment(s), if 
something other than water”). 
213 See, e.g., AM. PETROLEUM INST., REP. NO. 4122330215, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
FLUID PRODUCT COMPONENT INFORMATION DISCLOSURE (2011) (on file with author) 
(showing total water volume in gallons and chemical contents in an example of a Fracfocus 
disclosure). 
214 See generally Wiseman, supra note 135 (describing many of the disclosure 
regulations). 
215 See, e.g., Statewide Groundwater Baseline Sampling and Monitoring, 2 COLO. CODE 
REGS. § 404-1:609 (2013) (requiring baseline testing of groundwater near oil wells, gas 
wells, multi-well sites, and injection wells). Pennsylvania and West Virginia strongly 
incentivize baseline testing through presumptions that oil and gas operations caused water 
contamination within a certain distance and time. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(c) 
(West 1996 & Supp. 2013) (creating a rebuttable presumption that oil and gas operations 
cause water contamination within 2500 feet of an unconventional (fractured) well within 
twelve months of well completion or other activities); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-18 
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013) (creating a rebuttable presumption that drilling is the cause 
of contamination of “a fresh water source or supply within one thousand five hundred feet 
of the center of the well pad for horizontal well”). 
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B. Harm Thresholds and Institutional Expansion to Address Independent-
Probability Harms 
Identifying diseconomies of scale is only the first step of a needed multipart 
solution. Having acknowledged that diseconomies will occur or have already 
emerged, policymakers and agencies must develop effective rules for 
addressing them, and the very structure of agencies must change. Here, the 
type of diseconomy will influence the needed substantive approach. 
Independent harms that accumulate, for example, can be addressed by drawing 
a threshold of maximum acceptable harm. Assuming that existing regulations 
are tailored to control individual sources in a way that avoids this threshold, 
agencies will need to maintain steady enforcement rates by expanding staff 
numbers and inspections as the activity grows. 
1. Setting Overall Harm Thresholds 
The clearest solution to growing activities that cumulatively cause major 
harm – and particularly those that have independent effects – is to constrain the 
collective impact of the activity. If harm expands consistently with rising 
activity volumes, a simple cap on total cumulative harm, established ex ante, 
can cause regulatory costs on individual actors to rise along with harms. And 
as growing activities move closer to the total harm threshold, each new 
individual activity will be more stringently regulated in order to avoid 
exceeding the threshold.216 Provided that enforcement rates remain steady, this 
strategy might effectively control expanding harms. 
 One portion of the Clean Air Act provides an excellent model for this 
approach, and this should be expanded, with modifications, to address many 
diseconomies of scale. In the context of predicting and addressing cumulative 
harms, Dave Owen describes this ex ante threshold strategy as a 
“comprehensive approach”217 to environmental problems – the establishment 
and enforcement of a cap on impacts. This both provides agencies with the 
“opportunity to consider the aggregate consequence of all of the actions 
threatening to cause environmental degradation,”218 and to carefully consider 
where the threshold should be set. Under the Clean Air Act, when a new, 
stationary source of air pollution is proposed in a region, regulators first look 
to the total amount of pollution in the air in that region.219 Areas with dirty air, 
which tend to host large numbers of air pollution sources, are called 
 
216 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (2006) (requiring a highly stringent technology-based 
emissions limitation based on the lowest achievable emission rate).  
217 Owen, supra note 4, at 195. Professor Owen views a comprehensive approach as 
including both a definitive line above which cumulative impacts may not move and a 
coordinated agency approach, which sometimes combines federal and state efforts to 
achieve the threshold. Id. 
218 Id. at 196. 
219 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (requiring the EPA to publish national ambient air quality 
standards – the acceptable concentration of pollutants in the air). 
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nonattainment areas,220 and those that meet national air quality standards are in 
attainment.221 Sources adding new pollution in nonattainment areas face the 
strictest technology-based emissions controls222 and must ensure that through 
this technology or additional controls, they offset their new emissions of a 
regulated air pollutant.223 
As discussed above, the Clean Air Act does not take this approach with 
mobile sources: rather than starting with an overall cap, it directs the EPA to 
set technology-based “end of tailpipe” pollution limits on cars and, in some 
cases, to improve fuel economy standards over time.224 Although the caps that 
apply to stationary sources also affect mobile sources – states must consider 
how mobile sources contribute to nonattainment problems, for example – they 
are not the central component of mobile source regulation. Tailpipe regulations 
should, like stationary source controls, take into account the overall amount of 
pollution caused, even if for political reasons the EPA might later choose to 
regulate these sources less fully. The agency likely would not, after all, force 
people to stop driving cars if additional cars would cause exceedances of 
pollution thresholds. The default still should be to address scaling effects rather 
than to ignore them, however, leaving agencies the future flexibility to 
moderate the impacts of stringent regulation if politics, science, or preferences 
have changed since the initial setting of cumulative and local thresholds. 
The Clean Water Act, to a limited extent, also looks to collective harms. The 
Act directs the states to establish water quality standards based on desired uses 
of those waters,225 and the EPA establishes effluent limits for types of 
industrial sources; these limits are designed to achieve these water quality 
standards.226 If the effluent limitation is inadequate to ensure that water quality 
goals will be met, the Act specifically empowers the EPA to establish 
additional, water quality based controls within the permit of each industrial 
 
220 Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring nonattainment designation for any area that “does 
not meet (or that contributes to ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not meet) the 
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard” for a pollutant).  
221 Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring attainment designation for “any area . . . that meets 
the national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard” for a pollutant). 
222 Id. § 7503(a)(2) (requiring new stationary sources in nonattainment areas to comply 
with the lowest achievable emission rate). 
223 Id. § 7503(a)(1)(a) (allowing the issuance of permits for new stationary sources in 
nonattainment areas only if “total allowable emissions from existing sources in the region, 
from new or modified sources which are not major emitting facilities, and from the 
proposed source will be sufficiently less than total emissions from existing sources” so as to 
represent “reasonable further progress” in reducing air emissions). 
224 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
225 33 U.S.C. §1313(a)(3)(A), (c)(2)(A) (requiring states to adopt water quality standards 
and providing that any “revised or new water quality standard shall consist of the designated 
uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based 
upon such uses”). 
226 See supra note 45. 
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source.227 Finally, in areas that suffer from persistent violations of water 
quality standards despite the effluent and water quality limitations within 
permits, states are to establish caps on total pollution, called “total maximum 
daily loads” (TMDLs).228 Once a state has established this load, it works 
backwards: If the maximum amount of phosphorous that may be emitted daily 
into a lake is 100 grams, and there are 100 emitters in the lake, each may be 
limited to one gram of daily phosphorous emissions. 
Congress has tried to draw nonpoint sources beneath this cap – asking states 
to control these sources when they contribute to water quality problems.229 As 
introduced above, however, states have been reluctant to intrude into farmers’ 
and homeowners’ property rights,230 and would face major enforcement 
challenges even if they did attempt to regulate these individual sources of 
pollution. Accounting for scale in earlier Clean Water Act regulation might 
have prevented this nearly wholesale omission of nonpoint sources from 
pollution controls; although agencies would still have been hesitant to severely 
limit pollution from these sources, they might have included them in a plan to 
limit overall contributions to major water quality problems. And at minimum, 
state agencies might have begun to monitor these sources more closely. Indeed, 
although keeping track of thousands of small sources is difficult, local officials 
already conduct building code reviews of individual properties; while local 
officials investigate unsafe stairs or crumbling foundations, they could 
similarly observe fertilizers flowing from front yards. Alternatively, agencies 
could place small monitors at points within neighborhoods where runoff 
collects – as already occurs for stormwater in some urban areas, which flows 
from city streets and parking lots into sewers and surface waters at discrete 
points.231 
Unlike in the air and water context, setting one impact cap for oil and gas 
activities likely will be impossible. The process of drilling and fracturing a 
well involves many stages and affects soil, air, and water;232 it also fragments 
 
227 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (requiring the EPA Administrator to establish additional effluent 
limitations, including “alternative effluent control strategies” when, in the Administrator’s 
judgment, the discharges that complied with the technology-based effluent limitations in 33 
U.S.C. § 1311 “would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water quality in a 
specific portion of the navigable waters”). 
228 Id. § 1313(d). 
229 See id. § 1329(b)(1) (directing states to submit to the EPA a nonpoint source 
management program for sources contributing to waters for which TMDLs have been 
established). 
230 See Adler, supra note 162, at 75 (observing that there has been a “relative failure of 
state-driven nonpoint source pollution control programs”). 
231 See L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710, 
710-11 (2013) (describing “downstream monitoring stations” that measure the collective 
runoff from certain cities required to limit their stormwater runoff). 
232 See Wiseman, supra note 6 (describing impacts on soil, air, and water caused by 
violations of state environmental and oil and gas laws during well development). 
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habitats233 and causes a number of other harms, such as road damage, that 
might be difficult to quantify or define with a threshold. Setting a total 
acceptable amount of soil erosion from well sites in a given area, for example, 
would pose the same monitoring and enforcement problems that arise for other 
nonpoint sources. Despite this difficulty, the Delaware River Basin 
Commission, although not establishing a cap on total erosion and runoff from 
well sites, proposed (so far unsuccessfully) to stringently limit emissions from 
by requiring detailed erosion control measures at each site.234 And caps already 
exist for certain other oil and gas impacts. As Colorado has done, states can 
pull oil and gas wells within their existing, capped air regulation regimes, 
reducing emissions from each individual well in order to keep regions in 
attainment with respect to air quality goals.235 
Establishing multiple harm thresholds in oil and gas would not only be 
difficult from the perspective of drawing the appropriate line. It also would 
require the involvement of agencies at several jurisdictional levels. State 
wildlife agencies likely would address habitat fragmentation and species 
impacts. Environmental departments that decided to cap air pollutant emissions 
from wells would pull these sources into a federal program, thus avoiding the 
setting of a new cap but involving the EPA, at least indirectly. Regional water 
quality commissions could set maximum water withdrawal levels for different 
weather conditions, and a cap on nonpoint source pollution from well sites. 
This would inevitably involve state actors, as well, because some of these 
actors already regulate water withdrawals236 and issue permits requiring the 
control of erosion from well sites.237 These jurisdictional overlaps are not 
impossible to handle, though. The Delaware River Basin Commission’s 
proposed regulations of shale gas development, for example, specify whether 
oil and gas operators must comply with a state or regional standard within the 
 
233 See N.M. DEP’T OF GAME & FISH, OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES 2 (Aug. 
2007), available at http://www.wildlife.state.nm.us/documents/oilandgasguidelines.pdf 
(asserting that “fragmentation and degradation of habitat” can result from oil and gas 
development). 
234 See DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 104, at 53 (requiring site-specific plans to 
“satisfy Commission and host state erosion and sedimentation control requirements”).  
235 See Air Emissions Requirements for Oil and Gas Industry, supra note 86. 
236 See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(m)(2) (West 2012) (mandating detailed review 
for water withdrawals in Pennsylvania); Sources of Water for Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids, 
OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.state.oh.us/Portals/0/general%20pdfs/sources 
%20of%20water%20for%20hydraulic%20fracturing%20fluids.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2013) (describing registrations of water withdrawals and potential review required in certain 
cases). 
237 See Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 70, at 131-32 (describing stormwater runoff 
permitting requirements and collecting sources for Pennsylvania and the states that form the 
Delaware River Basin Commission). 
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regulations.238 In other cases, the regulations instruct operators to follow 
whichever directive – state or regional – is more stringent.239 
Allocating responsibility for the formation and implementation of multiple 
caps would be difficult but could be beneficial. As Jody Freeman and Jim 
Rossi have observed, overlap and redundancy of authority – as would occur if 
agencies were to cap erosion from well sites, for example – can ensure that 
actors with different areas of expertise address a problem from different angles 
and, potentially, regulate it more effectively.240 Inefficient capture by industry, 
which could lead to inadequate regulation, might also be less likely with more 
dispersed authority,241 and agencies could avoid certain administrative costs of 
overlap by better coordinating their regulatory activities. 
2. Changing Agency Structures 
When the harms of a growing, regulated activity expand independently with 
the costs of regulation and accumulate, this, to some extent, preserves the 
balance initially captured within a regulation. Agencies initially determined 
that a particular cost to industry was merited to control the harms associated 
with industrial activity, and if these harms rise predictably, the balance should 
remain.242 Where there is an existing regulation, agencies that recognize rising 
independent-probability harms that accumulate might be able to maintain the 
harm/regulatory cost balance by adding staffing resources and maintaining 
previous enforcement rates, although they still must ensure that harm does not 
exceed a particular cumulative threshold. Yet many agencies fail to do this. As 
a result of constrained state budgets, institutional inertia, or perhaps a lack of 
desire on the part of agencies or legislatures to expand regulation, agencies 
 
238 See, e.g., DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 104, at 65 (providing that certain oil 
and gas wastes “must either be beneficially reused off-site in accordance with applicable 
state regulations or disposed of at an appropriate waste treatment and/or disposal facility 
approved by the host state”). 
239 See, e.g., id. at 52 (“The reduction in the amount of the approved withdrawal from a 
discharge may not cause the stream flow below the point of withdrawal to be less than the 
Q7-10 flow or a more stringent value recommended by the appropriate host state agency.”).  
240 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1142 (2012) (“[I]t is . . . possible that some members of Congress vote 
to disperse authority because they recognize that social and economic problems are 
complex, and they wish to harness the unique expertise and competencies of different 
agencies.”).  
241 See Garrick Pursley & Hannah Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 928 
(2011) (observing that, in the renewable energy context, “local governments, compared to 
the state and federal governments, appear less likely to be targeted by the influential utility 
and carbon fuel lobbies that might vehemently resist” certain regulation because lobbyists 
“cannot be everywhere all of the time”). 
242 If agencies initially failed to regulate an activity at all, though, as has occurred with 
certain water withdrawals, a new regulation will, of course, be necessary. 
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sometimes maintain the same staffing numbers despite rapid expansions of 
regulated activities.243 
This problem is particularly apparent in the oil and gas context. In Texas, for 
example, the total number of shale gas wells rose from approximately 10,000 
in 2008 to 15,000 in 2010,244 yet in 2009 there were only 87 inspectors.245 As 
the number of fractured gas wells rose, enforcements of state laws at fractured 
well sites also appeared to decline.246 As the chief geologist of the Railroad 
Commission of Texas explained: “We underwent a hiring freeze beginning in 
2009 and lost personnel. Legal Enforcement was down two attorneys and field 
operations was also short of personnel.”247 And in New York, the DEC has 
strong political backing for a comprehensive new regulatory approach to 
proposed drilling and fracturing, but its capacity to write and enforce these 
regulations effectively is similarly limited. The DEC’s Commissioner has 
explained that sixty staff members are currently working to address 60,000 
comments received on the DEC’s proposed environmental impact statement, 
and New York has allocated no funds for additional staff.248 The 
Commissioner has also indicated that the DEC’s current staffing level 
constrains its ability to regulate potential fracturing.249 
In addition to receiving inadequate funding, agencies might fail to hire more 
staff or ramp up inspections due to traditional problems of institutional inertia, 
the limits of political capital, or the motivations of individual agency actors. 
Existing agency staff sometimes closely guard their turf and might view any 
change – even the addition of more inspectors, and particularly those from 
another department – as negative.250 Further, even if agencies recognize 
 
243 See supra note 93; infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.  
244 Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Well Count, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www rrc.state 
.tx.us/barnettshale/barnettshalewellcount_1993-2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
245 R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 31 (2011), 
available at www.sunset.state.tx.us/82ndreports/rct/rct_fr.pdf.  
246 The results from a public records request submitted by the Author revealed fewer 
enforcement actions from 2009-2011 than from 2007-2008. Email from Leslie Savage, 
Chief Geologist, R.R. Comm’n of Tex. to author (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:01 AM). 
247 Id. (responding to the question: “There seem to be fewer enforcements for the end of 
2009-through [sic] 2011. Should I just chalk this up to fewer violations occurring during this 
time, or did something else change?”). 
248 Casey Seiler, DEC Commissioner: No Staff Funds for Hydrofracking Enforcement, 
TIMES UNION (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/DEC-commissioner-
No-staff-funds-for-3125842.php (reporting that “DEC’s most immediate tasks include 
sorting through more than 60,000 comments sent in response to the latest draft of its 
environmental impact statement” and that at the time, “[a]bout 60 workers” were assigned to 
this task).  
249 Id. (“‘We’re not rushing,’ [the state’s environmental agency head] told reporters after 
his testimony. ‘We can only do what we can with the staff we have . . . .’”). 
250 See Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other 
Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 
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scaling problems and the need to grow their capacity, they have limited power 
to influence the legislature and the executive that directs agency priorities, and 
agencies must reserve this power for the issues their staff deem most 
important.251 
Some states with pending proposals for expanded well development, or that 
are experiencing high drilling rates, have stepped up staffing numbers despite 
these obstacles, and have conducted thousands of new site inspections. 
Pennsylvania, for example, more than doubled the number of oil and gas 
inspectors in its Department of Environmental Protection252 as the number of 
Marcellus Shale gas wells drilled nearly doubled between 2009 and 2010.253 
West Virginia went even further by attempting to ensure that staff numbers 
matched rising well numbers. In a comprehensive overhaul of oil and gas 
regulation enacted in 2011, the state legislature required the Secretary of the 
Department of Environmental Protection to “[d]etermine the number of 
supervising oil and gas inspectors,” inspectors, and other staff needed to carry 
out new regulatory requirements.254 It is not clear, however, that these needed 
inspectors have been hired. 
The examples from Pennsylvania and West Virginia provide good starting 
points to ensure that enforcement rates remain consistent as regulated activity 
grows. More is needed, though. Within agency enabling legislation, expansions 
in scale should trigger automatic increases in agency staffing: policymakers 
should estimate the likely impacts of a rapidly growing activity regulated by 
 
40 (1998) (concluding that “agency staff and managers” are “too concerned with protecting 
their program’s turf against other departments or agencies” and sometimes fail to focus 
adequately on long-term needs); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the 
Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 262 (2009) (observing that 
regulatory agency “staff members may share an interest in making their jobs as secure or 
easy as possible”). 
251 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 250, at 263 (arguing that “deciding how to prioritize 
various goals of the program” is an incremental and complex endeavor for an agency). 
252 See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE: TOUGH REGULATIONS, GREATER 
ENFORCEMENT 1 (May 2013), available at http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/ 
Document-95071/0130-FS-DEP4288.pdf (“Throughout 2009 and 2010, DEP more than 
doubled the number of inspectors.”); Sabrina Shankman, New Gas Drilling Rules, More 
Staff for Pennsylvania’s Environmental Agency, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 9, 2010, 12:44 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/new-gas-drilling-rules-more-staff-for-pennsylvanias-
environmental-agency (reporting that inspector numbers increased from 35 in 2008 to 76 in 
2009). 
253 Compare Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil & Gas Mgmt., WELLS DRILLED, 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Website%20Pictures/200
9/2009%20%20Wells%20Drilled.jpg (last updated Jan. 25, 2010) (indicating that 768 
Marcellus Shale wells were drilled in 2009), with Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil & 
Gas Mgmt., WELLS DRILLED, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/photo 
gallery/photo13295/2010%20%20Wells%20Drilled.gif (last updated Jan. 5, 2011) 
(reporting that 1386 Marcellus Shale wells were drilled in 2010). 
254 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-2(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
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the agency and should require staffing increases at various points of volumetric 
change. 
In light of already severe agency budget constraints, the enabling legislation 
should fund this automatic staffing increase through fees on the regulated 
industry: for each threshold level of activity requiring new staff, the legislation 
could provide for a higher per-well permitting fee. This is a relatively simply 
calculation: 500 new wells would require a new annual salary of, for example, 
$40,000, thus demanding an $80 permitting fee increase for each well. Indeed, 
although few if any states mandate the automatic permit fee increases proposed 
here,255 federal agencies in other contexts benefit from scale-based revenue 
structures, and several states experiencing booming oil and gas activity have, 
ex post, raised the fees associated with well development approvals and 
penalties at well sites.256 
If harms are simply cumulative, higher permitting fees might not even be 
necessary; each additional regulated actor will add money to the existing pot, 
thus funding new inspectors as needed.257 But where harms are interdependent, 
or where the cost of hiring inspectors increases – as occurs when agency staff 
are lured away by lucrative oil and gas jobs258 – automatic fee expansions 
might be needed to fund additional staff. 
C. Time- and Location-Based Limits and Jurisdictional Changes to Address 
Interdependent and Uneven Harms 
Policymakers can address certain diseconomies by setting cumulative harm 
thresholds and matching agency enforcement rates with activity expansion 
rates, but this approach will often fail to adequately address interdependent and 
uneven effects. No matter how many agency staff inspect sites and issue 
notices of violation of existing laws, the rapid expansion of some activities will 
have problematic effects depending on combined factors like weather 
 
255 See, e.g., R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 245, at 24 (observing that in Texas, most 
fees for oil and gas permitting, rule exceptions, and other activities “have not been raised in 
nine or more years”). 
256 See supra note 44 (describing a Food & Drug Administration revenue increase based 
on workload); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-7(g) (imposing a permit fee of $10,000 for the 
first horizontal well drilled at a site and $5000 for additional wells at the same site); Press 
Release, R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 2012: Year of Railroad Commission Accomplishments 
(Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/pressreleases/2012/122812.php 
(“The Commission strengthened its oil and gas enforcement actions by adopting penalty 
guidelines based on risks posed and a violation’s severity. Additionally, the Commission 
assigned higher penalties for repeat violators.”); Changes to Underground Injection Control 
Regulations, OHIO DIV. OF MINERAL RES. MGMT., http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/industry/ 
underground-injection-control#news (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (explaining that Ohio’s 
legislature increased the state’s underground saltwater injection control permit application 
fee from $100 to $1000 and raised fees per barrel of brine injected). 
257 I am grateful to Felix Mormann for this observation.  
258 I am grateful to Joshua Fershee for this observation.  
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conditions and the number of operators within an area. Harms will also 
concentrate in certain locations. 
Three improvements are necessary for these more complex scaling 
problems. First, where an expanding activity will create disproportionate harms 
because it occurs at a sensitive location, at a particular time, or as a part of 
high-density activity, statutes or regulations must draw time- or place-based 
boundaries that constrain or ban activity within certain areas or seasons. These 
could be similar to the “community risk caps” intended to limit certain 
concentrated harms that Daniel Farber and others have proposed.259 These 
types of localized thresholds will be particularly important when regulated 
activities rapidly increase; as thousands of entities compete for new space in 
which to construct well sites, for example, they have proposed (and in some 
cases, have begun) drilling in state parks, wildlife refuges, and other sensitive 
areas.260 Setting an ex ante threshold for this type of activity is possible. 
Although interdependent harms may be more difficult to predict than 
independent, cumulative ones, we already know that drilling an oil and gas 
waste disposal well in a seismically unstable area, or near a city’s aquifer, 
likely is not a good idea. 
Second, where limited pollution control technologies produce unusually 
powerful effects – a problem sometimes encountered at wastewater treatment 
plants, for example261 – states must review existing permits to ensure that 
technologies can accommodate and adequately treat new waste. Because some 
state agencies will have strong disincentives to conduct this review, 
policymakers must establish clear numerical thresholds above which 
technological review is mandated. 
Finally, where direct and indirect effects of oil and gas development expand 
beyond the well site or concentrate at discrete locations, in some cases 
unevenly affecting certain populations, legislatures might need to force 
relatively rapid shifts of jurisdictional authority to a broader or more localized 
level. State agency control over certain aspects of hydraulic fracturing and gas 
development, for example, might need to shift to a regional level through 
congressional approval of a regional compact. Alternatively, municipalities 
might need to have more authority to regulate more or less stringently 
depending on the harms they experience. 
 
259 Daniel R. Faber et al., Solving Environmental Injustices in Massachusetts: Forging 
Greater Community Participation in the Planning Process, 3 PROJECTIONS 109 (2002). 
260 See, e.g., Impacts of Leasing Additional State Forest Land, PA. DEP’T OF 
CONSERVATION & NATURAL RES. (last visited Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/cs/ 
groups/public/documents/document/d_000603.pdf (reporting that 700,000 out of 1,500,000 
acres of state forest land on the Marcellus Shale had been leased for natural gas extraction). 
261 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
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1. Time, Location, and Density-Based Harm Limits 
Growing industries that rely on finite resources like land often push new 
actors into sensitive environments. They might also cause a number of actors 
to converge on one region simultaneously, and all of these actors might 
demand the same resources, causing temporary scarcity and, sometimes, large 
harms. Policymakers therefore must sometimes constrain ex ante the volume of 
activity that expands into certain areas or occurs at particular times, locations, 
and densities – particularly where large or irreversible harms could arise. 
Some states and regional agencies already have begun to anticipate these 
problems in the oil and gas context. Pennsylvania, for example, recently 
increased required setbacks between wells and potentially sensitive resources, 
such as streams and wetlands.262 West Virginia established new setbacks and 
increased existing ones,263 and New York has gone further, proposing that no 
high-volume fracturing occur in the watershed that supplies New York City’s 
drinking water.264 In an ex post approach to scale-based change, agencies have 
also addressed certain unusual conditions on a case-by-case basis: as 
introduced previously, in the summer of 2012 the Susquehanna River Basin 
Commission (SRBC) halted sixty-four previously-approved water withdrawal 
permits for gas drilling “and other uses” due to “lower streamflow levels in the 
Susquehanna basin.”265 It did this because of an unusual harm-based threshold 
that required water withdrawals – even previously permitted withdrawals – to 
stop if stream flow dropped below a certain level.266 Ideally, other agencies 
would similarly establish these thresholds before the fact to avoid the 
inevitable circumstances in which agency officials fail to notice changing 
conditions and attendant threats.  
The Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, and agencies that implement them, 
should similarly anticipate conditions in which the effects of additional 
activities will have particularly high costs. Cities already do this to some extent 
by encouraging commuters to carpool or reducing public transportation fees on 
particularly hot “ozone code red” days, for example.267 If conditions become 
sufficiently dangerous, however, states, as part of their regulations that 
 
262 See, e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(b)(1) (West 2013) (requiring a minimum 
of 100-foot setbacks for wells and well sites from streams and wetlands). 
263 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-12(b) (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring setbacks for well 
drilling of 250 feet from water sources and 625 feet from dwellings or certain structures 
used to house cattle or poultry). 
264 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 20 (“[H]igh-volume 
fracturing activity is not consistent with the preservation of the [New York City and 
Syracuse] watersheds as an unfiltered drinking water supply.”). 
265 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
267 See, e.g., Air Quality Forecast, WASH. CNTY., MD., http://www.washco-md.net/air_ 
qual.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (“Maryland averaged 10 Code Red days a summer 
during the 1990’s [sic].”). 
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implement the Clean Air Act, might need to specify temperatures at which 
automobile driving must decline substantially. Similarly, for seasons when 
nonpoint pollution flows combine with cloudy weather (which reduces 
microbial-killing UV rays) to produce particularly dangerous bacterial or algae 
conditions in surface waters,268 states might need to temporarily prohibit 
farmers from spreading manure or landowners from applying fertilizers to 
lawns. 
Activities that concentrate in certain areas – thus disproportionately 
affecting certain communities – are more difficult to address through boundary 
drawing. States like New York have proposed to make certain areas entirely 
off-limits to shale gas development,269 and at one point considered allowing 
only economically distressed communities to develop their shale.270 But 
individuals within off-limits communities will object that they have given up 
millions of dollars in potential profits, while others living in economically 
distressed communities that experience both booming development and 
environmental externalities might be similarly unhappy. This will be 
particularly true for individuals who lack their own mineral rights but suffer 
the harms of development on neighboring lands.271 
In many cases, the participatory and compensation-based proposals already 
well developed in the environmental justice literature could help to address 
these scale-based harms. Local zoning processes that required oil or gas wells 
to be sited somewhere within a town272 but gave neighbors input regarding the 
ultimate location of the well, for example, would help. Fort Worth, Texas, 
which has nearly 2000 wells within its city limits as a result of the shale gas 
boom, already does this.273 For communities disproportionately affected by 
 
268 See Amir M. Abdelzaher et al., Presence of Pathogens and Indicator Microbes at a 
Non-Point Source Subtropical Recreational Marine Beach, 76 APP. & ENVTL. 
MICROBIOLOGY 724, 730 (2009) (“Sunlight and UV light are known to inactivate microbes 
in water.”). 
269 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57 (describing areas in 
which high-volume fracturing would be prohibited, including within the watershed of New 
York City’s water supply). 
270 See Hakim, supra note 197. 
271 See, e.g., Complaint at Law & in Equity, supra note 119, at 9 (describing neighbors’ 
complaints regarding contamination). 
272 This could be modeled from the siting scheme for cell phone towers in the 
Telecommunications Act, which Ashira Ostrow and Patricia Salkin suggest could be 
effectively applied to other necessary yet locally undesirable land uses. See Patricia E. 
Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for 
Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1092 (2009) (proposing a wind turbine 
siting policy based on the Telecommunications Act that would “(a) prohibit local 
governments from banning wind energy facilities; (b) require local governments to make 
decisions on wind siting within a reasonable period of time; and (c) require such decisions 
to be made in writing and supported by substantial evidence”). 
273 See, e.g., Gas Drilling Review Committee Minutes, CITY OF FORT WORTH 10-11 (June 
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drilling booms, Pennsylvania allows towns to vote to establish a fee274 on 
drilled and fractured wells; the proceeds go to a state fund and are redistributed 
to municipalities for road, bridge, and other infrastructural repairs; 
environmental remediation; and other projects that address oil and gas 
development impacts.275 
2. Setting Numerical Limits at Which States Must Review Pollution 
Treatment Technologies 
As introduced above, some interdependent effects arise when pollution from 
an expanding activity must be treated prior to disposal. In the oil and gas 
context, for example, some wastes can be pumped untreated underground into 
injection wells, but others flow through wastewater treatment plants, where 
they must be filtered and otherwise treated before being sent to surface 
waters.276 Treatment technologies have physical limits, though, and sometimes 
are unable to accept certain types or quantities of new wastes.277 Wastewater 
treatment plants operating under state-issued Clean Water Act permits are 
supposed to demonstrate that the plants’ systems can adequately treat the 
pollution that they receive,278 and states are supposed to monitor and enforce 
this requirement. The Act and EPA guidance, however, fail to fully define the 
events that should trigger states to check permits and ensure that plants are 
equipped to accept new wastes.279 As old, permitted plants in Pennsylvania 
accepted millions of gallons of new wastes from drilled and fractured wells, 
the Pennsylvania DEP did not review all of these plants’ permits, leading the 
EPA to intervene.280 After substantial EPA pressure, the DEP finally issued a 
 
28, 2012), http://fortworthtexas.gov/uploadedFiles/Gas_Wells/GDRC/12_June_GDRC.pdf 
(describing one resident’s concerns voiced at a meeting regarding a proposed well location). 
274 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302(a) (2012) (“The governing body of a county that has a 
spud unconventional gas well located within its borders may select whether to impose a fee 
on unconventional gas wells that have been spud in the county.”). 
275 Id. § 2314(g). 
276 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 57, at 6-58 (stating that oil 
and wastewater “may only be discharged utilizing all treatment processes within” the 
publicly owned treatment works). 
277 See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin to Michael Krancer, supra note 111, at 2 
(expressing concerns about inadequate treatment).  
278 See 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2012) (requiring pretreatment standards for “new sources of 
pollutants into publicly owned treatment works” in order “to insure [sic] that any source 
introducing pollutants” into the wastewater treatment plant “will not cause a violation of the 
effluent limitations established for any such treatment works,” and requiring these 
pretreatment standards to “prevent the discharge of any such pollutant” into the treatment 
plant that would “interfere with,” or be incompatible with, the treatment technology).  
279 See id. (lacking detailed direction for states regarding enforcement of treatment plans 
for plants). 
280 See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin to Michael Krancer, supra note 111, at 1-2 (“I 
believe it is critical to investigate these substances in the treated drinking water in affected 
  
2014] REMEDYING REGULATORY DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 291 
 
request, not a mandate, that gas operators stop sending wastes to these old 
plants.281 
Although the EPA – alerted by a New York Times article282 – prevented 
potential problems in Pennsylvania, the threat that beyond a certain threshold 
large quantities of wastes will overwhelm treatment technologies should not be 
addressed by case-by-case responses. Agencies set effluent limitations after 
conducting extensive review of technologies used in particular industries;283 
they should therefore be able to determine the limits of these technologies and 
the specific scale-based changes that should spur agency review. Accordingly, 
regulations should more clearly define the quantity and types of new wastes 
that should trigger review and modification. 
3. Requiring Periodic Revisions of Laws and Thresholds 
Setting boundaries regarding where and when activities may occur, as well 
as thresholds of total acceptable harm, will not always solve long-term scale-
based problems, as policymakers establishing ex ante regulations inevitably 
will misjudge certain effects, and some effects are unknowable ex ante. Just as 
sunset reviews can force agencies to consider volumetric changes in the 
activities that they regulate – and thus to identify diseconomies284 – 
legislatures, through similar sunset review provisions, can force agencies to 
periodically consider revising laws. The Clean Air Act, although failing to 
fully address the scale-based effects of mobile air pollution sources, requires 
the EPA Administrator to “from time to time revise” emission standards for 
vehicles, thus anticipating that the EPA will need to modify its regulatory 
response for a variety of reasons.285 For all types of air pollution, whether 
caused by stationary or mobile sources, the EPA also must consider revising 
the total “safe” levels of pollutant concentrations in the air every five years.286 
Revising overall thresholds, however, will not be effective if expansions of 
individual sources threaten exceedance of these thresholds. Shorter expiration 
 
watersheds . . . [t]o augment these actions, EPA will be taking additional steps directly using 
our authorities.”). 
281 Press Release, Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Calls on Natural Gas 
Drillers to Stop Giving Treatment Facilities Wastewater (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.portal. 
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=%2017071%20&typeid=1 (“At 
the direction of Governor Tom Corbett, acting Department of Environmental Protection 
Secretary Michael Krancer today called on all Marcellus Shale natural gas drilling operators 
to cease by May 19 delivering wastewater from shale gas extraction to 15 facilities that 
currently accept it under special provisions of last year’s Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) 
regulations.”). 
282 See Urbina, supra note 114. 
283 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (describing effluent limitations set best available 
control technologies economically achievable for a “category or class” of industry). 
284 See supra Part II.A.2. 
285 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006). 
286 Id. § 7409(d)(1). 
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dates for individual source permits – the documents that give industrial sources 
the permission to operate and to pollute at a certain level – therefore might be 
important, particularly where legislatures or agencies anticipate rapid change 
within an industry. 
4. Changing or Expanding Jurisdictional Authority to Address Uneven 
Effects 
When the majority of effects of an expanding activity concentrate in certain 
areas, broader solutions than enhanced enforcement or harm limits are needed. 
Some of the uneven costs caused by scaling changes are reminiscent of 
problems already identified in the literature, and may require similar remedies. 
In William Buzbee’s “regulatory commons,” a problem crosses boundaries 
and, although many agencies have some control, no one agency has full 
authority or incentive to address the externalities.287 This creates a space in 
which a number of regulators act – even with an appearance of overregulation 
– but still inadequately control the externalities of the regulated activity. The 
traditional concept of scaling as it is typically used in the legal literature (but 
not in this Article), provides similar lessons for the scaling described here, 
explaining that agency control should, but often does not, match the scope of 
externalities generated by the regulated activity.288 
Oil and gas development, in particular, most powerfully affects the 
municipalities and states where wells are located,289 thus producing 
externalities wholly within existing regulatory boundaries. Although 
policymakers and agencies must change substantive rules and institutional 
resources to address these expanding harms, they need not shift jurisdictional 
boundaries or formally coordinate with other government actors, aside from, 
perhaps, learning useful approaches from those actors. But all three examples 
of diseconomies of scale within this Article,290 including mobile sources of air 
pollution, nonpoint water pollution sources, and oil and gas development, 
sometimes create transjurisdictional problems. Pollutants from oil and gas 
drilling and other nonpoint source activity, for example, can collect within 
watersheds,291 which cross municipal and sometimes state lines, and certain air 
pollutants from mobile sources drift downwind across state boundaries.292 In 
many cases, U.S. state and federal agencies lack the jurisdictional reach needed 
 
287 Buzbee, supra note 129, at 1. 
288 See Osofsky, supra note 1, at 242-43. 
289 See, e.g., Spence, supra note 56, at 478 ([A]n examination of what we know about 
fracking’s environmental impact suggests that much of that impact is local.”). 
290 See supra Part I.A.1-3. 
291 See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about the 
impact of gas drilling and fracturing within the watershed of specially protected Delaware 
River waters). 
292 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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to match these externalities, thus allowing these problems to affect certain 
areas disproportionately. 
The EPA has federal control over air pollution and thus can address air 
emissions that cross jurisdictional boundaries, but states have continued to 
argue over whether the agency has correctly assessed and accounted for 
downwind effects, causing major delays in regulation.293 Many mobile source 
problems, such as urban sprawl that increases total vehicle miles driven,294 are 
beyond the control of the EPA or even any one state or municipality. 
Additionally, regional coalitions have not, for the most part, been formed to 
address these problems – in part due to municipal resistance to ceding control, 
as well as coordination problems.295 Although regional water basin 
commissions address oil and gas drilling and nonpoint source pollution in 
some areas,296 their authority often is not sufficient to address all activity that 
affects water quality. The Susquehanna River Basin Commission, for example, 
limits withdrawals of water from the river – including for oil and gas 
development – but does not govern well site development in the watershed, an 
activity that can send harmful sediment into the river.297 
The Clean Air Act, although generally failing to address the scale-based 
effects of mobile sources of air pollution, also provides a useful model in 
shifting jurisdictional controls. The federal government primarily limits 
tailpipe emissions from mobile sources so that auto manufacturers need not 
follow fifty different emissions standards.298 In nonattainment areas with dirty 
air, however – areas that typically have large numbers of stationary and/or 
mobile sources – the Clean Air Act allows states, with EPA permission, to 
avoid federal preemption of mobile source emissions controls and adopt 
 
293 See, e.g., id. at 12 (agreeing with the state plaintiffs that the EPA had improperly 
promulgated transport rules intended to address “good neighbor” issues).  
294 See ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION, THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 85-87 (2000) (“[Our] country’s fundamentally 
misguided approach to transportation planning as a whole . . . explain[s] why our country 
faces both an urban and environmental crisis.”). 
295 See, e.g., MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SHRINKING THE CARBON 
FOOTPRINT OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 8 (2008) (describing increasing vehicle miles 
traveled); Buzbee, supra note 129, at 8 (discussing governance challenges to fixing urban 
sprawl). 
296 See Chesapeake Bay, supra note 166 (detailing EPA monitoring of nonpoint source 
pollution that reaches Chesapeake Bay). 
297 See Frequently Asked Questions, SRBC’s Role in Regulating Natural Gas 
Development, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, http://www.srbc.net/programs/natural_ 
gas_development_faq htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (describing regulations of water 
withdrawals but not well site development). 
298 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (“No state or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt 
or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines . . . .”).  
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stricter controls identical to California’s.299 These types of jurisdictional 
flexibility – allowing more localized governments to address certain 
environmental harms that concentrate in particular areas, and expanding 
jurisdiction to a regional level where harms cross boundaries – will be 
exceedingly important in preventing and mitigating regulatory diseconomies of 
scale. 
D. Justifying Ex Ante Harm Limits 
The substantive thresholds proposed here, including prevention of 
cumulative harm and harm that occurs at particular times in certain locations, 
might seem onerous and insufficiently flexible – particularly in light of the fact 
that science, political tolerance for harm, and economic priorities will change 
in the future. But several factors will weaken these objections. 
First, I do not propose a comprehensive approach to regulating the activity; 
instead, I suggest a partial and relatively early approach to problems that might 
later expand. Specifically, the ex ante thresholds proposed here involve harm 
limits, and certain individualized controls that will be triggered as we near 
harm limits. These individualized controls need not always be command-and-
control-type regulations, but rather an assurance that the actor, by whatever 
means acceptable, will not cross the harm threshold. A prohibition on oil and 
gas drilling in a protected habitat might cause operators to select another well 
location, or to drill a well at a distant surface point and then drill laterally 
thousands of feet below the surface. A restriction on clustered fracturing in a 
particular region during drought300 might similarly delay drilling in that region, 
but will not prohibit it altogether. Further, as introduced above,301 various harm 
thresholds might never be reached despite the activity growing, in which case 
there will be few costs to industry because more stringent limitations on 
individual actors will not be triggered. Many actors will still view this as 
onerous and comprehensive, but it is, in the grand scheme of regulation, 
somewhat incremental. 
As Jonathan Gilligan and Michael Vandenbergh have observed, there is a 
“panacea bias” in the literature, which errs toward comprehensive solutions 
hashed out over a long period of time because it assumes that incremental 
solutions will be problematic.302 This bias also tends to ignore the political 
difficulty of implementing these solutions, which is not a problem if we have 
plenty of time to address the harms of the regulated activity; we can wait for 
 
299 Id. § 7507. 
300 See, e.g., Press Release, Susquehanna River Basin Comm’n, supra note 101.  
301 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
302 Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility 
in Climate Instrument Choice 3-4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 13-7, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220788.  
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the hoped-for comprehensive rule to emerge without irreversible effects 
occurring in the meantime.303 
For many diseconomies of scale, we may have the luxury of waiting, and we 
could potentially aim for a broader regulatory scheme. Indeed, with the 
infusion of considerations of scale in the initial regulation, comprehensive 
approaches might eventually emerge. But trying to wait and regulate 
comprehensively would not be advisable in certain areas, including in the oil 
and gas context. Some irreversible effects might occur while we wait – for 
example, an aquifer polluted by an oil and gas waste disposal well is incredibly 
difficult to clean up.304 And incremental, politically tolerable ex ante limits 
might be necessary in light of the inevitable push by those most affected by 
regulation – the regulated actors themselves – to prevent the establishment of 
new, more onerous regulation later on.305 Relatively quick responses will be 
needed in the event that the harm threshold is reached, and rapid enactment of 
regulation might be effectively blocked by those with the most concentrated 
interests against it; in the regulatory lag that ensues, permanent harm could 
occur. 
Perhaps the strongest objection to ex ante thresholds is that they simply will 
not work – we cannot predict the harms or even the direction that growth will 
take, as has been argued in the land use field and broader regulatory 
contexts.306 But even for changing regulated activities that are harder to 
predict, such as technological innovation, agencies can sometimes estimate the 
 
303 Id. at 3 (“Exclusion of political feasibility concerns is a minor problem if delays are 
not important for assessing the performance of policy instruments, but it is a vital concern if 
delay matters.”). 
304 See, e.g., Dancy, supra note 65, at 18 (observing in the oil and gas context that 
“[o]nce a fresh water aquifer is damaged, in many instances it is economically impossible to 
restore that aquifer to its original condition in any meaningful time period”); Ground Water 
Cleanup at Superfund Sites, EPA (Dec. 1996), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/con 
media/gwdocs/brochure htm (explaining in the Superfund context, which involves 
hazardous waste sites that have likely suffered far more environmental damage than would 
an improperly constructed and managed oil and gas site, that “[s]ometimes, depending on 
the type of contamination, the ground water cannot be restored”). 
305 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1286-88 (2006) (describing industry fears that 
environmental groups will capture government agencies and cause “overzealous agency 
regulation,” but concluding that these fears are “implausible” because environmental groups 
are diffuse and large). 
306 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Freedom – a Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 
1308 (1955) (“We have not discovered in human behavior mechanical or mathematical 
relationships that will enable us to predict invariant happenings.”); Charles E. Lindblom, 
The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 85 (1959) (“Non-
incremental policy proposals are . . . typically not only politically irrelevant but also 
unpredictable in their consequences.”). 
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likely emergence of affordable pollution control technologies, for example,307 
and scale-based harms should be even more predictable. For independent 
harms that increase evenly, we can reasonably estimate total spill risk when 
wells expand from 100 to 1000. Establishing ex ante thresholds of total 
acceptable harms – as well as locations and times at which certain activities 
should not occur – is not an impossible task, although not an easy one. 
E. Deciding Who Decides308 
A number of major legal and administrative modifications will be required if 
scale-based change is to trigger rapid and effective response. We need 
governments to identify and address diseconomies of scale, and to do so 
nimbly, and this will raise important questions about institutional competency 
and the risks of inaction. Locating the best institution to address regulatory 
diseconomies of scale will depend largely on the scale-based effects involved, 
the lack of will within certain branches of government, and concerns relating to 
inefficient capture of the relevant governing entity.309 
In terms of the substantive goals of scale-based regulation, addressing 
anticipated changes ex ante will be crucial. Setting cumulative harm 
thresholds, delineating areas where impacts must be constrained or prohibited, 
and defining times or seasons during which certain activities may not occur 
will provide these needed ex ante boundaries. To address concerns that 
conditions will later change – thus eviscerating the usefulness of 
predetermined thresholds – flexibility of implementation is necessary to allow 
agencies to tailor regulation specifically to the problem that emerges. This will 
require legislatures to grant agencies broad discretion for implementation, as 
already occurs through many cooperative federalist schemes in environmental 
law.310 The setting of the threshold itself likely should be left to the agency, 
with sufficient congressional guidance to avoid nondelegation problems.311 
 
307 Cf. Blais & Wagner, supra note 179, at 1732 (providing an illustration of a 
technology-based standard for water pollution, which would ratchet down allowed pollution 
if the “the technology was expected to improve significantly”).  
308 For a similar phrase in the fracturing context, see John R. Nolon & Victoria Polidoro, 
Hydrofracking: Disturbances Both Geological and Political: Who Decides?, 44 URB. LAW. 
507 (2012).  
309 For a comprehensive analysis of the best level of government to address oil and gas 
development, see Spence, supra note 56. 
310 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1578 (2007) (exploring cooperative 
federalism and its nuances, including whether the federal government should set a 
maximum or minimum level of stringency which states may not exceed or fall below in 
their regulations). 
311 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting a 
nondelegation challenge to Congress’s directive to the EPA to set “ambient air quality 
standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the administrator” are 
necessary to achieve health-based goals). 
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Agency actors are likely best suited to implement carefully researched and 
scientifically based regulations to control expanding harms, particularly if 
information-forcing regulations provide the agency actors with needed data. 
The accountability deficit problem is particularly acute in this case, though, 
because decisions about acceptable levels of harm are highly political. 
Legislatures should require heightened participatory opportunities in these 
rulemaking processes – multiple public hearings in addition to written 
comments, for example – to help close the accountability gap. 
Despite the expertise of agencies, there is a concern that they will be 
insufficiently motivated to act, either before or after scale-based harms occur. 
As Mark Seidenfeld has observed, a variety of factors affect agency agenda 
setting.312 While agency heads might look to the instructions of current 
legislators or the demands of future ones313 – both of which might not 
recognize scale – they also might receive inaccurate information from agency 
staff or even from a particular department.314 This information could 
inaccurately portray scaling problems. 
Legislation allowing citizen suits to compel agency action can help address 
this problem. Legislatures should place nondiscretionary duties on agencies to 
address certain scale-based problems; as they already do for a number of 
environmental laws,315 they should also allow individuals to sue when harmed 
by agencies’ failures to perform their duties, such as considering a harm 
threshold rule, or to enforce existing rules. 
Policymakers, too, could remedy agencies’ failure to address scale-based 
change by taking on the challenge themselves. Legislatures in West Virginia316 
and Pennsylvania,317 for example, passed relatively comprehensive acts 
modifying oil and gas laws, although certain agencies – particularly in 
Pennsylvania – were also very active in modifying their own regulations.318 
West Virginia specifically directed its oil and gas agency to study the effects of 
drilling and fracturing, determine the number of new staff needed to address 
this growing practice, and write new substantive regulations.319 In Colorado, 
on the other hand, the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission took up the 
charge itself and comprehensively amended all of its oil and gas rules in the 
midst of a drilling and fracturing boom.320 
 
312 See Seidenfeld, supra note 250, at 258-68.  
313 Id. at 261. 
314 Id. at 264. 
315 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006) (allowing citizens to sue the EPA Administrator 
for a failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the Clean Air Act).  
316 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-2 (LexisNexis 2009).  
317 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301-81 (2012).  
318 41 Pa. Bull. 805, 815 (Feb. 5, 2011) (codified at 25 PA. CODE § 78.73). 
319 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-2 (LexisNexis 2009). 
320 See COGCC Amended Rules Redline, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N 
(Dec. 17, 2008), http://cogcc.state.co.us/RuleMaking/FinalRules/COGCCFinalRule 
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Whether certain members of the legislature, the agency, or both have the 
will to address scale-based change, the rules that actually emerge will, of 
course, depend largely on politics. In many cases, legislative bodies might be 
satisfied by the general tendency of agency actors, and everyone else, for that 
matter, to forget that existing, regulated activities can cause large, new harms 
as they grow. After all, the economic benefits of booming development often 
flow directly to state coffers in the form of sales taxes, direct taxes on 
resources extracted, and other revenues.321 Agencies, too, might be tempted to 
ignore scale-based change, because it consistently produces more work for 
them and angers the regulated actors with which agencies sometimes have 
revolving door relationships.322 
Despite their potential penchant for ignoring scale-based harms due to 
political pressure, legislatures might be the best institutions to initially act in 
the face of general inertia in this area. Since they are not directly tasked with 
implementing the laws – and can pass the blame for stringent laws to the 
agencies that write the implementing regulations – these representative 
institutions might have more motivation to address scale-based change, at least 
in the abstract. Provided that they have a long-term vision of the needs of 
citizens in the state, they might anticipate problematic boom and bust cycles 
that will suddenly deplete state coffers, or contamination events that could 
require expensive clean-up. And they might provide general directives to 
agencies to consider and address such problems. 
Either agencies or legislators addressing scale-based change could, of 
course, be subject to undue influence from the actors with the most to lose or 
gain from statutory or regulatory changes, while ignoring the needs of those 
with scattered, diffuse interests that are collectively large.323 And it is not 
always clear whether there is more of a threat of capture at the agency or the 
legislative level – in oil and gas, in particular, agencies are known for their 
 
Amendments_121708.pdf (reflecting comprehensive revisions). 
321 See, e.g., CHARLES COSTANZO & TIMOTHY W. KELSEY, PENN STATE COLL. OF AGRIC. 
SCIENCES, STATE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF MARCELLUS SHALE: WHAT THE PENNSYLVANIA 
DATA SAY FOR 2010 (2011), available at http://pubs.cas.psu.edu/FreePubs/pdfs/ua468.pdf 
(“State tax collections in counties with significant activity related to Marcellus shale on 
average had larger increases in sales and personal income tax collections and less 
precipitous declines in realty transfer tax collections than did other Pennsylvania 
counties.”). 
322 See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in 
Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
115, 138 (2009) (exploring potential industry influence in an EPA report that supported a 
congressional exemption for hydraulic fracturing). 
323 See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 241, at 923 (“The classical objection is that 
interest groups that favor lax environmental regulation and have high individual stakes in 
regulatory outcomes – paradigmatically industry groups – tend to be small and cohesive, but 
groups favoring stricter environmental regulation tend to be more diffuse and less 
organized.”).  
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frequent interactions with industry and, in some cases, for potentially bending 
scientific results in response to agency pressure.324 But legislators, too, hear 
frequently from industry lobbyists and have been known to give unusually 
beneficial exemptions to them.325 Environmental and other interests, however, 
might have sufficient organizational powers in this area to overcome the 
transaction costs of collecting thousands of diffuse interests – and they may 
meaningfully or possibly disproportionately influence legislative and 
administrative outcomes.326 Indeed, it appears that powerful and wealthy 
environmental interests, in addition to certain widespread citizen concern, 
influenced Governor Cuomo’s decision to continue delaying the approval of 
fracturing operations in New York.327 
Perhaps the lower the level of lawmaking, the less chance there is for 
capture, thus suggesting that we should not ask whether agencies or legislative 
bodies are more likely to be captured, but which level of government, 
generally, might best avoid repeat interactions with one special interest or 
another. In this case, local regulation of scale-based change might be 
preferable, as industry actors and powerful interest groups cannot be 
everywhere at once.328 And this might militate against state preemption of 
local oil and gas drilling329 – although excessive local control could also lead 
to insufficient levels of development due to NIMBYist (not in my backyard) 
concerns, as well as inadequate control of effects that spill over boundaries.330 
The possibility that more diffuse and numerous governments addressing one 
issue are less likely to be captured might also support the cooperative 
federalism scheme already used in environmental regulation, which allows 
 
324 EPA, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF 
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 7-5 
(2004) (concluding that further study of the risks of fracturing was not merited); Wiseman, 
supra note 322, at 138 (describing how industry might have encouraged the EPA to reach 
this conclusion). 
325 See Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 70 (exploring the federal exemptions in depth). 
326 But see Bagley & Revesz, supra note 305, at 1286-88 (arguing that the theory that 
well-organized environmental groups will “capture” agencies is “wholly implausible,” and 
noting the massive funding advantage of industry groups and the relatively small number of 
members within each industry group (and thus their ease of organization)). 
327 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo on Gas Drilling Prompts Both Anger and 
Praise, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www nytimes.com/2012/10/01/nyregion/with-
new-delays-a-growing-sense-that-gov-andrew-cuomo-will-not-approve-gas-drilling.html? 
pagewanted=all (“The governor has been influenced by the unshakable opposition from a 
corps of environmentalists and celebrity activists who are concerned about the safety of the 
water supply.”). 
328 See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 241, at 934-35. 
329 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3303-3309 (2012), held unconstitutional by Robinson Twp., 
Wash. Cnty. v. Pennsylvania, 2013 WL 6687290 (Pa. Dec. 19, 2013). 
330 Cf., Nolon & Polidoro, supra note 308, at 523-25 (describing municipal bans on 
fracturing in New York that were upheld by the state’s lower court). 
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states to determine how to keep certain pollutants within their boundaries 
below federally designated thresholds.331 Regardless of the level of 
government or institution chosen, the most effective ways for resisting the 
undue influence of any one group in the decisionmaking must continue to be 
explored. 
Not all of the harms of scale-based change will be predictable, however, 
thus necessitating an ex post role for courts. Indeed, nuisance law is essentially 
a threshold scaling response: even when actors comply with public law limits, 
courts may still deem their activities unacceptable – particularly when the 
activities expand into particular areas. As the courts have recognized, a pig in 
the parlor is problematic.332 Although enlisting hundreds of individual court 
cases to address a growing problem is likely far less efficient than modifying 
one regulation to address the problem, courts allow individuals experiencing 
disproportionate effects of a regulated activity to raise their specific complaints 
and potentially have them addressed. 
Legislation is important in the court context, too, so that individuals can 
make specific complaints as harms expand into certain regions. In many cases, 
plaintiffs will have difficulty proving causation or gathering the necessary 
evidence to support other claims. In Pennsylvania, property owners and 
neighbors claiming alleged contamination from oil and gas development have 
used statutes with relatively broad hazardous cleanup regulations, as well as 
state common law principles for medical monitoring,333 to better argue their 
case. It appears, however, that no plaintiff has yet persuaded a court that 
damages are owed as a result of oil and gas drilling and fracturing.334 Thomas 
Merrill and David Schizer have proposed a solution, outlining a comprehensive 
system through which courts would address fracturing-related claims – even 
those for which causation is difficult to establish.335 
 
331 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (directing states to write “State Implementation Plans” 
to ensure the achievement of federal air quality standards within state boundaries). 
332 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“A nuisance may be merely a 
right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”). But see 
Merrill & Schizer, supra note 6 (proposing a regulatory compliance defense where the risk 
of a particular oil and gas development activity is relatively well known, establishing 
causation is not too difficult, and industry has complied with regulation that requires state of 
the art industry practices). 
333 See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 513 (M.D. Pa. 
2010) (initially rejecting, in a case that later settled, a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims 
for medical monitoring funds under Pennsylvania’s common law). 
334 See SMITA WALAVALKAR, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 
DIGEST OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CASES (2013), http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/ 
download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=622373 (collecting cases). 
335 Merrill & Schizer, supra note 6 (proposing the use of res ipsa loquitur and other 
doctrines, which would create something close to strict liability for industry actors, for 
certain impacts for which risks are “not yet well understood” and causation may be difficult 
to show). 
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As with most regulatory challenges, scale-based problems require a 
combination of actors – local, state, regional, and federal officials – and a 
mixture of judicial, legislative, and agency action. These actors must make a 
number of changes to laws and institutions. Agencies must grow as their 
regulated activity grows, and this might require automatic increases in 
permitting fees or other revenues to fund this expansion. Agency jurisdiction 
might need to change rapidly as growth expands into certain areas, 
necessitating quick action by legislatures to form new regional agencies or to 
shift authority to an entirely new level. Regulations must set acceptable levels 
of harm and constraints on activities where harms could have disproportionate 
effects. They also must provide for adequate compensation of individuals in 
areas that are most disproportionately affected by these harms. Pieces of many 
of these solutions already reside within the environmental justice, regulatory 
commons, cooperative federalism, and “massive problems” literature.336 In the 
regulatory diseconomies context, however, these pieces require careful 
tailoring and integration to address scale-based change comprehensively, 
which contributes to many of our lingering environmental problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The most qualified, hard-working, and diligent agency actors and 
policymakers might strive to predict the intensity of industrial activity, but 
often they will not succeed. Ten years ago, most geologists or state oil and gas 
agencies would not have projected that the United States could become the 
world’s largest oil producer and a major exporter of oil and gas.337 But even 
when we do not know whether and how rapidly certain activities will grow, we 
can establish the total harms that we are likely to tolerate from this activity and 
write policy and regulations with these harms in mind. In other cases, we can 
be relatively certain that convenient activities like driving cars will grow, and 
we can directly predict many of the harms associated with this growth. Despite 
these forward-looking abilities in the scale-based context, a core failure of 
legislation, regulation, and the implementation of regulation by agencies is the 
lack of attention to scale. When drafting legislation and forming agencies, 
Congress and state legislatures operate under core assumptions about the level 
of intensity of a regulated activity, and these become ingrained within legal 
and institutional structures. 
To remedy this fundamental failure in public law, we must write laws and 
form agencies with both scale and flexibility in mind. We must require 
agencies (and, ideally, policymakers) to consider the likely effects of 
expanding scale through, for example, carefully-tailored environmental review 
provisions; we also should encourage them to track changing volumes of 
 
336 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (introducing some of the environmental 
justice literature); supra note 183 and accompanying text (introducing “massive” problems); 
supra note 310 and accompanying text (exploring aspects of cooperative federalism). 
337 See supra notes 7-8. 
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regulated activity and the adequacy of agency control through modified forms 
of sunset review. To allow policymakers and agencies to both identify 
emerging scale-based problems and those that already have occurred, 
information-forcing regulations must require agency actors to disclose data that 
further illuminates the risks. 
Substantively, where we can predict the effects of a growing activity, we 
should set static, ex ante thresholds that prevent certain levels of harm from 
occurring, or that constrain the timing or location of certain activities. If we 
later decide that the benefits of the growing activity justify even higher harm 
levels, then we can modify those thresholds when we reach that point; in the 
meantime, the established limits will prevent potentially irreversible harms. 
And finally, institutionally, we must ensure that agencies have adequate staff to 
enforce these harm limits if the activity grows, triggering personnel expansions 
at particular thresholds of regulated activity. We also must more effectively 
and rapidly respond to scale-based problems ex post when it is difficult to 
predict these harms. 
This proposal is, in part, simply another pitch for regulatory nimbleness; the 
more quickly the intensity of an activity changes and the harm it causes 
increases, the more danger of major harm as policymakers and agencies 
formulate a response. But it is also largely a proposal for forming better law at 
the outset: the administrative law literature has already explored the propensity 
of laws to become dangerously entrenched.338 Another factor, which we have 
largely ignored, makes this stasis even more problematic. If we are stuck 
within laws that assume a certain level of oil and gas development, driving of 
cars, or agricultural production, and that set the level of regulatory control 
based on assumptions of this level of harm, then our regulation will soon be 
badly off balance. 
This Article proposes that we transfer lessons from the few state and federal 
environmental laws that incorporate scaling considerations to the many areas 
of law that currently suffer from scale-based problems. Indeed, although the 
rapidly growing oil and gas industry best demonstrates diseconomies of scale, 
it, too, has begun to provide vital lessons; some states have already started to 
regulate with an eye toward scale-based concerns, and these leaders provide 
models for several of the solutions proposed here. In light of concerns about 
earthquakes caused by oil and gas waste disposal wells drilled in or near fault 
 
338 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 129, at 22-27 (discussing the potential inadequacy of 
regulation due to a mismatch between regulatory opportunities and agency jurisdiction); 
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (observing “that it is much harder for an agency to promulgate a rule 
now than it was twenty years ago” and describing judicially imposed factors, and other 
factors, contributing to this problem); Seidenfeld, supra note 250, at 289-93 (hypothesizing 
that agencies might not act (and thus might leave old rules in place or pursue a relatively 
unaggressive agenda) due to a variety of internal dynamics and psychological factors – 
including status quo bias and omission bias – the tendency to prefer no action to the taking 
of action). 
  
2014] REMEDYING REGULATORY DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 303 
 
zones, for example, Arkansas prohibits oil and gas disposal wells in certain 
areas, at least for now,339 and Ohio requires continuous monitoring of these 
wells for potential seismic problems.340 New York is conducting a 
comprehensive review of the potential effects of large numbers of 
hydraulically fractured wells, and it has proposed limits to prevent certain 
potential harms, including the prohibition of fracturing within New York 
City’s watershed.341 Other states, however, have lagged behind, thus 
threatening to allow unacceptable harms to accrue. And oil and gas regulation 
is not the only culprit; many other areas of the law might suffer from similar 
diseconomies.342 With simple attention to the fact that regulated human 
activities, even seemingly benign ones, could cause disproportionate harm at a 
certain scale, we might avoid many of the tragic pitfalls of our current system 
of public law. 
Many growing activities do not, of course, cause these types of harms. 
Indeed, as this Article emphasizes, the expansion of domestic gas production 
appears to be a net positive when comparing total costs and benefits as 
opposed to regulatory costs and harms. The great challenge of ex ante scale-
based regulation is to avoid stifling the growth of activities with net benefits 
and allowing innovation while simultaneously ensuring that these activities do 
not cause unacceptable harms. This can be done with carefully tailored 
regulations that set reasonable harm thresholds; avoidance of more stringent 
controls on individual actors when it appears that we are not close to reaching 
harm thresholds; ratcheting down regulation when it appears that the activity 
produces fewer harms as it grows; and periodically revisiting regulation and 
institutional size to determine needed changes in either direction. Scaling 
 
339 178-00-001 ARK. CODE R. pt. H, r. H-1(s)(2) (LexisNexis 2012); Permanent Disposal 
Well Moratorium Area, ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N (June 20, 2011), http://www.aogc.state.ar. 
us/notices/Ex.%201B%20-Permanent%20Disposal%20Well% 20Moratorium%20Area.pdf. 
340 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
341 See supra Part II.A.1. 
342 For example, the mortgage crisis seemed to escalate when numerous firms 
simultaneously realized the true value of risky trades. See Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse 
Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2013) (“The crisis attacked the economy 
when financial markets rapidly revalued mortgage securities owned throughout the financial 
system, not when a single firm, or small number of firms, failed.”). I am grateful to Jay 
Kesten and Manuel Utset for discussions involving the possible diseconomies of scale 
resulting from derivatives and other aspects of the mortgage crisis. Online gambling and 
betting, too, could potentially exhibit diseconomies of scale. As millions of people gain 
access to easier betting outlets, harms might be expanding in disproportionate ways – 
potentially through interdependent harms associated with networked transactions. See Keith 
C. Miller, The Internet Gambling Genie and the Challenges States Face, 17 J. INTERNET L. 
1, 23 (2013) (suggesting that “the social problems that are inherent in gambling will have an 
expanded base” if online gambling grows). I am grateful to Dr. Ryan Rodenberg for 
discussions regarding the potential diseconomies of scale associated with the growth of 
internet gaming.  
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considerations involve one small, yet very important, tool within an 
increasingly large set of strategies to improve public law. 
 
